CVE-2026-97903 in Linux
الملخص
بحسب MITRE • 25/09/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exit: hold a reference to thread_pid across proc_flush_pid
Commit 0a36bad01731 ("release_task: kill the no longer needed get/put_pid(thread_pid)") removed the reference around proc_flush_pid(). It assumed that free_pids(post.pids) at the end of release_task() would keep thread_pid alive until then.
That assumption is wrong. __change_pid() only records a detached PID in post.pids when pid_has_task() is false for every PIDTYPE. If another task still uses the exiting task's PID as its process group or session ID, __unhash_process() removes the exiting task's PIDTYPE_PID link but leaves the PID out of post.pids. release_task() therefore holds no reference to it after dropping tasklist_lock.
The other task can then remove the remaining PIDTYPE links. Its free_pids() call schedules delayed_put_pid(), and the RCU callback can free the PID before the first release_task() reaches proc_flush_pid().
An unprivileged reproducer races wait4(-1) against setsid() to trigger this ordering. Three of three fresh v7.2 KASAN boots reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache+0x3e2/0x3f0 Read of size 8 by task h7_pid_reaper/1921
Call Trace: proc_invalidate_siblings_dcache release_task wait_consider_task __do_wait do_wait kernel_wait4
Freed by task 0: kmem_cache_free put_pid delayed_put_pid rcu_core
Last potentially related work creation: __call_rcu_common free_pids ksys_setsid
KASAN identified a 144-byte object from the pid cache and located the bad read 80 bytes into the freed object, matching pid->inodes. With an explicit reference, three of three fresh boots completed without a KASAN report. The concurrent RCU callback dropped its reference while proc_flush_pid() was protected, and the balancing put_pid() performed the final free afterward.
Take a reference before __unhash_process() clears p->thread_pid and release it after proc_flush_pid() completes.
A tested source reproducer is available privately on request. No controlled read or write, information leak, or privilege escalation is claimed. The mainline patch applies directly to v6.19.y and newer; v6.16.y through v6.18.y need a context-adjusted backport.
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