إرسال #1052005: MaysWind AriaNg-Native 1.3.13 (Electron 22.3.27) Code Injectionالمعلومات

عنوانMaysWind AriaNg-Native 1.3.13 (Electron 22.3.27) Code Injection
الوصفProduct: AriaNg-Native (MaysWind/AriaNg-Native, Electron desktop front-end for the aria2 download daemon) Affected versions: 1.3.13 (Electron 22.3.27); identical handler code on master and release 1.3.14 as of 2026-08-28. Unfixed. SUMMARY: The task detail page renders the daemon-reported task directory (task.dir) as a clickable 'open containing folder' link and the IPC handler behind it falls back to shell.openPath(dir) whenever a naive path.join(dir, fileName) existence probe misses. task.dir is fully attacker-controllable under the documented RPC trust model (plaintext HTTP JSON-RPC with an empty RPC secret by default; remote seedbox/NAS usage explicitly supported). On Windows shell.openPath uses the ShellExecute open verb, so pointing task.dir at an executable file turns one ordinary click into arbitrary code execution as the logged-in user. ROOT CAUSE: main/ipc/main-process.js (render-open-local-directory) performs no validation of dir or fileName: it computes path.join(dir, fileName) and, if the joined path does not exist, calls shell.openPath(dir). The link visibility check in app/scripts/controllers/task-detail.js uses fs.existsSync(task.dir) only and never verifies the path is a directory. main/lib/localfs.js getFullPath also joins without validation. ATTACK CHAIN: the attacker forges aria2 tellStatus responses (hostile LAN / ARP / compromised router, or a malicious RPC endpoint the victim connects to) -> sets dir to a path of an executable already on disk (attacker-chosen files are deliverable as downloads in this threat model) and files[0].path to a POSIX-slash path whose basename cannot exist under that directory -> the join misses -> the victim clicks the 'open containing folder' link -> shell.openPath executes the attacker binary. PROOF OF CONCEPT: verified end-to-end on AriaNg-Native 1.3.13 for Windows (Electron 22.3.27) on Windows 11 with a locally controlled JSON-RPC server returning crafted tellStatus responses: clicking the rendered link launched the benign marker executable (process observed, screen-recorded). Control experiment with dir pointing at a real directory containing the executable confirmed the safe shell.showItemInFolder branch runs and nothing executes. IMPACT / CVSS: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 7.2 (High; an AV:N variant applies when the victim connects to an attacker-operated RPC endpoint over the internet). CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) leading to arbitrary code execution. FIX: validate that the resolved dir is an existing directory before exposing the link; never pass a daemon-supplied path to shell.openPath without a type check and an explicit user confirmation; prefer shell.showItemInFolder for directories. DISCLOSURE: MITRE CNA-LR ticket 2098975 (MCID 15928485) was withdrawn before this submission. Vendor notified at [email protected] in parallel; public sanitized advisory at the link. No CVE assigned. DEDUP: NVD and GitHub Advisory Database searched for AriaNg-Native: no existing CVE/GHSA. The public advisory repository is the only disclosure record.
المصدر⚠️ https://github.com/LeoWSY-hashblue/ariang-native-openpath-rce
المستخدم
 NeoWSY (UID 82976)
ارسال22/10/2026 01:27 PM (29 أيام منذ)
الاعتدال20/11/2026 07:16 PM (29 days later)
الحالةتمت الموافقة
إدخال VulDB441542 [MaysWind AriaNg-Native حتى 1.3.14 IPC main/ipc/main-process.js shell.openPath dir تجاوز الصلاحيات]
النقاط20

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