CVE-2017-12096 in Circle with Disney
Summary
by MITRE
An exploitable vulnerability exists in the WiFi management of Circle with Disney. A crafted Access Point with the same name as the legitimate one can be used to make Circle connect to an untrusted network. An attacker needs to setup an Access Point reachable by the device and to send a series of spoofed "deauth" packets to trigger this vulnerability.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/04/2019
The vulnerability described in CVE-2017-12096 represents a critical flaw in the WiFi management implementation of Circle with Disney devices, which are smart home security cameras designed to provide wireless connectivity for monitoring purposes. This weakness stems from insufficient validation of network authentication processes during the WiFi connection establishment phase, creating a pathway for malicious actors to exploit the device's wireless behavior through carefully crafted network interference techniques.
The technical exploitation mechanism relies on a specific form of wireless attack known as deauthentication attacks, where an attacker establishes a rogue access point using the same SSID as the legitimate network that the Circle device is configured to connect to. Through the transmission of spoofed deauthentication packets, the attacker can force the device to disconnect from the trusted network and subsequently attempt to reconnect to the malicious access point. This process exploits a fundamental flaw in the device's WiFi roaming behavior, specifically its failure to properly validate network authenticity before establishing connections. The vulnerability falls under CWE-287, which addresses authentication failures in network protocols, and demonstrates how improper handling of wireless network transitions can create security risks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple network disruption, as it allows attackers to potentially intercept and manipulate all network traffic originating from or destined to the compromised Circle device. This includes sensitive data such as video streams, configuration parameters, and authentication credentials that may be transmitted over the wireless connection. The attack requires minimal resources to execute, as the attacker only needs to set up a rogue access point within range of the target device and send deauthentication packets, making this vulnerability particularly dangerous in environments where such attacks could be conducted without detection. The device's behavior of automatically reconnecting to previously known networks without sufficient authentication verification creates a persistent security gap that can be exploited repeatedly.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on implementing robust network authentication mechanisms that validate the legitimacy of wireless networks before establishing connections, as recommended by the ATT&CK framework's network infiltration techniques. Device manufacturers should implement proper network validation procedures that verify network authenticity through secure channels, such as certificate-based authentication or secure association protocols. Additionally, network administrators should consider implementing wireless intrusion detection systems that can identify and alert on suspicious deauthentication activity, while also ensuring that Circle devices are configured with strong network security settings that limit the device's willingness to automatically connect to unknown networks. The vulnerability highlights the importance of secure network management practices and demonstrates how seemingly minor implementation flaws in wireless protocols can create significant security risks in IoT devices.