Invia #837582: langflow-ai/langflow - `Langflow bundle URL loading` - `custom component discovery/import path` <=1.9.3 Remote Code Execution / Untrusted Code Loadinginformazioni

Titololangflow-ai/langflow - `Langflow bundle URL loading` - `custom component discovery/import path` <=1.9.3 Remote Code Execution / Untrusted Code Loading
Descrizione## Title Langflow bundle URLs load remote custom components that execute code at startup ## Disclosure Status Strict 0day candidate. No matching public GitHub issue, PR, advisory, CVE, or local issue-database disclosure was identified for this specific component and sink during this run. ## Affected Vendor / Product - Vendor / Project: `langflow-ai/langflow` - Product / Component: see affected components below ## Affected Versions / Source Snapshot - Verified version/snapshot: `current main snapshot` - Verified commit: `a4d875a9a1ac` - Local source path: `/tmp/vuln-src/langflow` ## Vulnerability Type Remote Code Execution / Untrusted Code Loading ## Severity Critical ## CWE CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code; CWE-829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere ## CVSS `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (suggested 8.4; higher if bundle URLs are low-priv configurable)` ## Affected Components - `Langflow bundle URL loading` - `custom component discovery/import path` ## Summary Langflow can load bundle URLs containing custom components and import/execute Python component code during startup or bundle processing. A configured remote bundle therefore becomes a code execution source. ## Technical Details 1. Bundle URL support fetches a remote archive or bundle-shaped content. 2. Custom component files inside the bundle are placed on component search paths. 3. Import/discovery of Python component code executes module-level code without a trust boundary or signature verification. ## Exploitability Verification - PoC command: ```bash python3 /tmp/vuln-pocs/langflow_bundle_custom_component_rce_poc.py ``` - Verification result: PoC creates a bundle-shaped ZIP containing a Python component and confirms executed=True with marker_content langflow-bundle-rce-poc. - Full rerun evidence: `/tmp/vuln-pocs/a_class_0day_rerun_20260515_124431.log` ## Proof of Concept The PoC listed above is a minimal, local exploitability check for the vulnerable sink. It avoids destructive behavior and demonstrates the security boundary violation with marker files, loopback servers, or direct policy checks. ## Impact An attacker who can influence bundle URLs or a deployment template can execute arbitrary Python code in the Langflow server process, leading to full application compromise. ## 0day Deduplication Local GitHub issue DB exact/pattern searches found no matching Langflow disclosure. Web exact searches for bundle_urls/load_bundles_from_urls/custom component startup RCE patterns did not identify a matching public advisory/issue during this run. Additional exclusion rule used for this submission set: findings derived from public GitHub issues, public PRs, advisories, CVEs, or already-disclosed vulnerability reports were not counted as strict 0day items. ## Remediation Do not auto-import remote custom component code. Require explicit trust approval, signatures or allowlists, sandbox component loading, and disable remote bundle URLs by default in production.
Fonte⚠️ https://github.com/dxz0069/softwareoverflow/blob/main/langflow_bundle_url_custom_component_startup_rce_vulndb.md
Utente
 ST4R (UID 96634)
Sottomissione26/05/2026 17:30 (28 giorni fa)
Moderazione21/06/2026 15:14 (26 days later)
StatoAccettato
Voce VulDB372612 [langflow-ai langflow fino a 1.9.3 Bundle URL Loader escalationi di privilegi]
Punti20

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