提出 #808771: eladmin 2.7 Improper Access Controls

In eladmin v2.7, the POST /api/users endpoint binds the HTTP request body directly to the JPA User entity via @RequestBody Userresources. While the endpoint is protected by @PreAuthorize("@el.check('user:add')") and enforces a role-level hierarchy check(checkLevel()), neither guard inspects the isAdmin field, a Boolean property on the User entity that operates as a privilege flag entirely independent of the role-based access control system.When isAdmin is set to true, the RoleServiceImpl.buildPermissions() method short-circuits all role-based permission resolution and returns a single hard-coded "admin" authority. The central authorization gate AuthorityConfig.check() then evaluateselPermissions.contains("admin") as true, bypassing every @PreAuthorize annotation across the entire application. This effectively grants the newly created user unrestricted super-administrator access, regardless of the roles actually assigned to that account.

Any authenticated user holding the user:add permission can create an account that possesses full super-administrator privileges, bypassing all role hierarchy restrictions. This constitutes a vertical privilege escalation from a delegated administrative role to unrestricted system-wide access. The created account's elevated privileges persist across sessions and survive role reassignment, as isAdmin is evaluated independently of role membership. Furthermore, because the "admin" authority short-circuits all permission checks, this backdoor account cannot be constrained by any future role or menu configuration changes.

• ソース: ⚠️ https://github.com/elunez/eladmin/issues/897
• ユーザー: AliceS614 (UID 94277)
• 送信: 2026年04月21日 08:59 (2 月 ago)
• モデレーション: 2026年05月07日 19:22 (16 days later)
• ステータス: 承諾済み
• VulDBエントリ: 361917 [eladmin 迄 2.7 Users API Endpoint UserController.java checkLevel 特権昇格]
• ポイント: 20