提出 #865683: Shenzhen Aitemi M300 Wifi Repeater r0-ea7890a Command Injection情報

タイトルShenzhen Aitemi M300 Wifi Repeater r0-ea7890a Command Injection
説明# m300 smacfilter name command injection Command injection vulnerability located on the MT02 M300 WIRELESS-N REPEATER. The WIRELESS-N REPEATER takes in parameters to the `/protocol.csp` endpoint and the `name` parameter is vulnerable to command injection and buffer overflows. User has full control of the `name` field which gets appended to the busybox shell command `uci set firewall.smacfilter%d.name=` through `sprintf()`. A similar call to system, `doSystemComLib()` is called with a parameter of the command, leading to command injection by an unauthenticated user on the MT02 M300 WIRELESS-N REPEATER. The targeted binary `commuos` runs as root leading to full system compromise. ## Version ``` Linux version 4.4.194 (luotao@wisewish) (gcc version 5.4.0 (LEDE GCC 5.4.0 r0-ea7890a) ) #0 Thu Apr 18 02:51:26 2024 ``` *The software running on the repeater is not known to be updated from OSINT collections* ### Bug 1: Name parameter in SMACFilterRules: ``` name_param_value = (char *)get_params_value(request_parameters,"name"); . . . sprintf(stack_smac_command,"uci set firewall.smacfilter%d.name=%s",section,name_param_value); ``` ### POC for Mac Command Injection: ``` http://192.168.11.1/protocol.csp?fname=net&opt=smacfilter_conf&function=set&act=add&name=test;%20touch%201&enable=1&mac=44:44:44:44:44:44 ``` The above POC will create a file named `1` in the `/` directory. The command `touch 1` is appended to the name parameter above. This can be replaced by any command the busybox ash shell supports for execution by an unauthenticated remote user.
ソース⚠️ https://github.com/IEATASICS/m300-repeater-bugs
ユーザー
 metermult (UID 99212)
送信2026年06月22日 21:24 (2 月 ago)
モデレーション2026年08月08日 15:57 (2 months later)
ステータス重複
VulDBエントリ387184 [Shenzhen Aitemi M300 Wi-Fi Repeater r0-ea7890a sprintf enable/name/mac 特権昇格]
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