Отправить #1052007: bytebase dbhub 1.2.3 Incorrect Access ControlИнформация

Названиеbytebase dbhub 1.2.3 Incorrect Access Control
ОписаниеProduct: DBHub (bytebase/dbhub, database MCP gateway; official Docker image) Affected versions: 1.2.3 (current release at report time; unfixed). SUMMARY: DBHub enforces read-only mode with two layers: a keyword classifier (escapeHatchFunctionKeywords, src/utils/allowed-keywords.ts) and a database-level BEGIN READ ONLY transaction (src/connectors/postgres/index.ts). For SQL Server, DBHub defends both layers against pass-through functions (OPENQUERY/OPENROWSET/OPENDATASOURCE, sqlServerPassThroughKeywords) whose work executes on a remote source and is therefore invisible to both layers. The PostgreSQL dblink family (dblink_exec, dblink, dblink_send_query) is exactly this class — remote execution from a plain SELECT, not contained by a read-only transaction — but is absent from escapeHatchFunctionKeywords.postgres. A tool argument (LLM-produced and steerable via prompt injection) such as SELECT dblink_exec('host=internal-db port=5432 dbname=app user=app password=...', 'UPDATE accounts SET balance = 0 WHERE id = 1') passes the classifier (leading keyword select, no matching escape-hatch function) and executes inside BEGIN READ ONLY without error, because the write happens on the remote libpq connection. The remote statement's status/rows are returned into the model context. The same holds for pg_advisory_lock/pg_advisory_xact_lock (session-level locks taken inside a read-only transaction persist on the pooled connection past COMMIT — the session-side-effect class DBHub already blocks for MySQL via get_lock/release_lock/release_all_locks). IMPACT: An attacker who can influence tool arguments (e.g. via prompt injection into an agent session, or a malicious MCP client) can make DBHub execute arbitrary SQL — UPDATE/DELETE/DDL/CREATE ROLE — on any PostgreSQL server reachable and authenticatable from the DBHub host (trust auth, .pgpass, or attacker-supplied credentials in the dblink parameter), while the operator believes the execute_sql tool is read-only (readOnlyHint=true). Remote data is returned into the model context (exfiltration channel), and dblink_connect to attacker-chosen hosts turns the MCP host into an internal-network probe (SSRF). pg_advisory_lock additionally enables cross-session denial of service that the query-timeout guardrail cannot cover, since the lock outlives the query. This is exactly the boundary the existing guard was built to draw: the same file already rejects the SQL Server members of this class, and DBHub's own engine-layer comment claims the backstop "rejects any write, even one the keyword classifier failed to catch (e.g. SELECT setval())" — dblink defeats precisely that claim because the write is remote. DBHub's GHSA history treats read-only-mode gaps as security issues (GHSA-mwwr-p57h-56pf / CVE-2026-61788 scored 7.4; GHSA-j656-3hf2-fvjc / CVE-2026-61789). Proof of impact (loopback lab, DBHub 1.2.3 official Docker image, [[tools]] readonly=true): CTRL-1 tools/list: execute_sql readOnlyHint=true -> confirmed CTRL-2 execute_sql "UPDATE local_secret ..." -> READONLY_VIOLATION (classifier fires) CTRL-4 execute_sql "SELECT setval('probe_seq',1,false)" -> "cannot execute setval() in a read-only transaction" (engine layer fires) ATTACK execute_sql "SELECT dblink_exec('host=1do-dbhub-remote ...', 'UPDATE vault SET secret=''DBHUB-PWN-MARKER''')" -> success, "UPDATE 1" physical verification (direct psql on the victim server, bypassing DBHub): vault row = 1|DBHUB-PWN-MARKER (persistent write on another database) ATTACK execute_sql "SELECT * FROM dblink(..., 'SELECT secret FROM vault')..." -> victim data returned into model context ATTACK execute_sql "SELECT pg_advisory_lock(4242)" -> success; a second session's pg_advisory_lock(4242) cancels at statement_timeout=3s; pg_locks shows the pooled connection (pid) holding the advisory lock Preconditions (stated honestly): the local database has the dblink extension installed (contrib module, ships in the official PostgreSQL image, common in data platforms); the target server is reachable and authenticatable from the DBHub host. Deployments using stdio on a single-user machine are lower impact; DBHub's documented HTTP deployment (with the built-in workbench) is the primary exposure. AFFECTED VERSION: - 1.2.3 (current release, git tag v1.2.3 == 4ac6e89e; audited via official Docker image bytebase/dbhub:1.2.3) CVSS: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 8.1 (self-assessed; happy to align with your CNA scoring — for reference, your CVE-2026-61788 for the same guard family scored 7.4) SUGGESTED FIX: Add the remote-execution class (and related session-side-effect class) to escapeHatchFunctionKeywords.postgres, mirroring sqlServerPassThroughKeywords: postgres: ["pg_read_file", "pg_read_binary_file", "pg_ls_dir", "dblink", "dblink_exec", "dblink_send_query", "pg_advisory_lock", "pg_advisory_xact_lock", "pg_stat_file"], (If preferred, a deny-pattern in the postgres connector's read-only path as defense-in-depth works too.) Long term, structural statement parsing is the durable answer to list-vs-language drift — the same drift this file has been closing reactively per dialect (#349, #377, GHSA-61789). CVSS v3.1: 8.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N; self-assessed). CWE: CWE-184 (Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs) DISCLOSURE: Reported privately to the maintainers via GitHub PVR on 2026-09-07 (GHSA-69r3-848g-rpx6, acknowledged the same day, state triage, no CVE requested through GitHub). Not publicly disclosed. Lab reproduction: 8/8 live tests on the official 1.2.3 Docker image, including physical verification of a persistent write on a second PostgreSQL server. DEDUP: NVD/GitHub/OSV searched: DBHub advisory history for this guard family is GHSA-mwwr-p57h-56pf (CVE-2026-61788, 7.4) and GHSA-j656-3hf2-fvjc (CVE-2026-61789). Neither covers dblink or session-level advisory locks. FIX: Add dblink, dblink_exec, dblink_send_query and pg_advisory_lock/pg_advisory_xact_lock to escapeHatchFunctionKeywords.postgres, mirroring sqlServerPassThroughKeywords; a deny-pattern in the postgres read-only path is an acceptable defense-in-depth supplement.
Пользователь
 NeoWSY (UID 82976)
Представление22.10.2026 13:27 (29 дни назад)
Модерация20.11.2026 19:19 (29 days later)
Статуспринято
Запись VulDB441546 [Bytebase DBHub до 2.0.0 Read Only Mode allowed-keywords.ts escapeHatchFunctionKeywords tool эскалация привилегий]
Баллы17

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