Gửi #862683: unitedbyai DroidClaw 0.5.3 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (CWE-639)

# Technical Details
A Cross-Device Session Rebinding vulnerability exists in the `POST /goals/execute` scheduled-goal callback handler in `server/src/routes/goals.ts` of DroidClaw.

The application fails to enforce the stored session's owner and target device when resuming a scheduled callback. The handler validates only that `sessionId` exists and is not cancelled, then trusts caller-supplied `deviceId` and `userId` from the unsigned callback body to select the online WebSocket target and LLM configuration. When `QSTASH_CURRENT_SIGNING_KEY` is unset, the route skips signature verification entirely, accepting arbitrary JSON. An attacker who knows a valid scheduled `sessionId` can forge a callback that redirects execution onto a victim's connected device.

# Vulnerable Code
File: server/src/routes/goals.ts
Method: goals.post("/execute") handler
Why: The handler performs only a session existence check (status != cancelled) but never reloads and enforces the stored agent_session.userId or agent_session.deviceId. It then passes attacker-controlled deviceId, userId, and goal directly into runPipeline(...), allowing cross-device session rebinding.

# Reproduction
1. Deploy DroidClaw with QSTASH_CURRENT_SIGNING_KEY unset so the callback route accepts unsigned JSON.
2. Seed a scheduled agent_session for the attacker user and connect both attacker and victim devices via /ws/device.
3. Send a forged POST /goals/execute with attacker's sessionId but victim's deviceId: `curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18080/goals/execute -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"sessionId":"session-attacker-scheduled","deviceId":"device-victim","userId":"user-attacker","goal":"open wifi settings"}'`
4. Observe the server delivers the goal-derived command (e.g., open_settings) to the victim device WebSocket instead of the attacker's device.

# Impact
- Cross-device command execution: attacker can redirect stored scheduled sessions onto victim's connected device
- Attacker can cause DroidClaw to execute goal-derived commands on a victim's phone through the legitimate device-control channel
- The vulnerable path is the same path used to drive broader device automation through runPipeline(...)

• Nguồn: ⚠️ https://github.com/unitedbyai/droidclaw/issues/18
• Người dùng: JondaChen (UID 99096)
• Đệ trình: 18/06/2026 11:12 (cách đây 2 các tháng)
• Kiểm duyệt: 05/08/2026 23:32 (2 months later)
• Trạng thái: Bản sao
• Mục VulDB: 383396 [unitedbyai droidclaw đến 0.5.3 Unsigned Scheduled Callback goals.ts nâng cao đặc quyền]
• điểm: 0