CVE-2000-0772 in Messaging Management System
Summary
by MITRE
The installation of Tumbleweed Messaging Management System (MMS) 4.6 and earlier (formerly Worldtalk Worldsecure) creates a default account "sa" with no password.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/27/2014
The vulnerability described in CVE-2000-0772 represents a critical security flaw in the Tumbleweed Messaging Management System version 4.6 and earlier, formerly known as Worldtalk Worldsecure. This issue stems from improper default configuration practices during the software installation process, creating a fundamental security weakness that persists across multiple system deployments. The vulnerability specifically involves the creation of a default administrative account named "sa" without any password protection, effectively providing unauthorized access to system administrative functions. This default account configuration violates fundamental security principles and creates an immediate attack surface that adversaries can exploit to gain full system control.
The technical flaw manifests as a privilege escalation vulnerability that directly maps to CWE-798, which addresses the use of hard-coded credentials in software. The absence of password protection for the default administrative account "sa" creates a persistent backdoor that remains active until manually addressed by system administrators. This vulnerability operates at the authentication layer of the system, bypassing normal access controls and providing immediate administrative privileges to anyone who knows or discovers the default account name. The flaw is particularly dangerous because it exists in the installation process itself, meaning that every deployment of the affected software version is vulnerable by default, regardless of subsequent security hardening measures.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond immediate unauthorized access to encompass potential system compromise, data theft, and service disruption. Attackers who discover the default "sa" account can exploit it to gain complete control over the messaging system, potentially accessing sensitive communications, modifying system configurations, or using the compromised system as a pivot point for further attacks within the network. This vulnerability directly aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078 which covers valid accounts and T1566 which covers credential harvesting, as the default account provides an easily exploitable credential that requires no additional reconnaissance or privilege escalation efforts. The widespread deployment of this software version across various organizations created a significant risk landscape where numerous systems remained exposed to this default credential attack vector.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate administrative action to address the root cause of the issue. System administrators must first identify and disable or delete the default "sa" account if it exists, and then implement proper password policies that enforce strong authentication requirements for all administrative accounts. The recommended approach includes changing the default account name and implementing robust password complexity requirements, while also ensuring that the system does not automatically create accounts with weak or no passwords. Organizations should conduct comprehensive audits of their installed software versions to identify all systems running vulnerable versions of the Tumbleweed MMS and implement proper configuration management practices to prevent similar issues in future deployments. This vulnerability also highlights the importance of following security best practices such as the principle of least privilege and the need for proper software supply chain security to prevent the distribution of vulnerable software with insecure default configurations.