CVE-2000-1209 in Insight Manager Xe
Summary
by MITRE
The "sa" account is installed with a default null password on (1) Microsoft SQL Server 2000, (2) SQL Server 7.0, and (3) Data Engine (MSDE) 1.0, including third party packages that use these products such as (4) Tumbleweed Secure Mail (MMS) (5) Compaq Insight Manager, and (6) Visio 2000, which allows remote attackers to gain privileges, as exploited by worms such as Voyager Alpha Force and Spida.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/11/2025
The vulnerability described in CVE-2000-1209 represents a critical authentication flaw in Microsoft SQL Server products that has significant implications for database security and enterprise network infrastructure. This weakness specifically targets the default installation configuration of the system administrator account known as "sa" which is automatically created during the setup process of SQL Server 2000, SQL Server 7.0, and Microsoft Data Engine 1.0. The flaw occurs when this privileged account is configured with a null password, creating an easily exploitable entry point for malicious actors seeking unauthorized access to database systems.
The technical nature of this vulnerability aligns with CWE-798, which categorizes the use of hard-coded credentials with null values as a significant security weakness. The default null password configuration for the "sa" account essentially eliminates the authentication barrier that should normally protect the most privileged database user account. This flaw exists across multiple Microsoft SQL Server variants and third-party applications that incorporate these database components, including Tumbleweed Secure Mail, Compaq Insight Manager, and Visio 2000, demonstrating how widely this vulnerability can propagate through enterprise environments. The exploitation mechanism is straightforward and does not require complex attack vectors or specialized tools, making it particularly dangerous for widespread deployment.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond individual database systems, as it provides attackers with complete administrative control over targeted SQL Server installations. When exploited by worms such as Voyager Alpha Force and Spida, this vulnerability enabled rapid propagation across networks, allowing malicious code to spread automatically from one compromised system to another. The default nature of the vulnerability means that any system running the affected SQL Server versions would be immediately vulnerable upon installation, creating a massive attack surface that security administrators could not easily identify or remediate without specific knowledge of the configuration. This characteristic places the vulnerability squarely within ATT&CK technique T1078.004, which covers legitimate credentials used for persistence and privilege escalation.
Organizations affected by this vulnerability faced significant risk of data compromise, system takeover, and potential lateral movement throughout their network infrastructure. The null password condition allowed attackers to bypass authentication entirely, providing unrestricted access to database contents, user information, and system configurations. The widespread deployment of affected third-party applications meant that even organizations not directly using SQL Server could be compromised through indirect exploitation paths. Remediation efforts required immediate password configuration changes for the "sa" account, implementation of network segmentation to limit SQL Server exposure, and comprehensive system audits to identify all affected installations. The vulnerability highlighted the critical importance of secure default configurations and proper access control implementation in database security practices, serving as a foundational lesson in the dangers of leaving default administrative accounts with minimal security protection.