CVE-2001-0415 in REDIPlus
Summary
by MITRE
REDIPlus program, REDI.exe, stores passwords and user names in cleartext in the StartLog.txt log file, which allows local users to gain access to other accounts.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/31/2018
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2001-0415 represents a critical security flaw in the REDIPlus program's REDI.exe executable component that demonstrates poor secure coding practices and inadequate credential handling mechanisms. This issue specifically affects the program's logging functionality where sensitive authentication information including usernames and passwords are stored in plain text format within the StartLog.txt file. The vulnerability stems from a fundamental failure in the application's security architecture to implement proper encryption or obfuscation of sensitive data during log file creation, creating a persistent exposure that undermines the confidentiality of user credentials.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability manifests through the application's logging mechanism that indiscriminately writes authentication tokens to disk without any form of data protection or access control measures. When the REDIPlus program executes and logs user sessions, it creates the StartLog.txt file containing cleartext credentials that remain accessible to any local user with file system permissions. This design flaw directly violates established security principles and represents a classic example of insecure data storage practices that have been documented in various security frameworks including the CWE database under categories related to improper handling of sensitive information. The vulnerability operates at the file system level where the program creates log files with insufficient access controls, allowing unauthorized local users to read the contents and extract authentication credentials.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple credential theft to encompass broader security implications for systems running the affected software. Local attackers with minimal privileges can exploit this weakness to escalate their access privileges by leveraging stolen credentials to impersonate legitimate users and gain unauthorized access to protected resources. This represents a significant threat vector in environments where multiple users share the same system or where privilege separation is not properly enforced. The vulnerability also creates audit and compliance challenges since it violates fundamental security requirements for protecting sensitive information and demonstrates a lack of proper security awareness during the software development lifecycle. The attack surface is particularly concerning in multi-user environments where the log file may be accessible to other users or where system administrators may inadvertently expose the file through improper permissions or configuration settings.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements to prevent similar issues in future software deployments. The most effective immediate solution involves modifying the application's logging mechanism to implement proper credential obfuscation or encryption before storing sensitive information in log files, with specific recommendations aligning with the principle of least privilege and defense in depth as outlined in various cybersecurity frameworks. System administrators should implement strict file access controls on the StartLog.txt file and related logging directories, ensuring that only authorized processes can access these sensitive files. Additionally, the vulnerability highlights the importance of conducting comprehensive security reviews during software development phases and implementing secure coding practices that prevent the accidental exposure of sensitive data. Organizations should also consider implementing monitoring solutions to detect unauthorized access attempts to log files and establish proper incident response procedures to address credential compromise events. The remediation process should include comprehensive testing to ensure that the logging functionality no longer exposes cleartext credentials while maintaining the necessary operational logging for system administration and troubleshooting purposes.