CVE-2001-0659 in Windows
Summary
by MITRE
Buffer overflow in IrDA driver providing infrared data exchange on Windows 2000 allows attackers who are physically close to the machine to cause a denial of service (reboot) via a malformed IrDA packet.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/06/2019
The vulnerability described in CVE-2001-0659 represents a critical buffer overflow condition within the IrDA (Infrared Data Association) driver component of Windows 2000 operating systems. This flaw exists in the infrared communication subsystem that enables wireless data exchange between devices using infrared technology. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it can be exploited by attackers who are physically present in the vicinity of the target machine, making it a proximity-based attack vector that bypasses traditional network security measures. The IrDA protocol implementation in Windows 2000 handles infrared data transmission and reception through a kernel-level driver that processes incoming infrared packets from nearby devices.
The technical nature of this buffer overflow stems from inadequate input validation within the IrDA driver's packet processing routine. When the driver receives malformed infrared packets, it fails to properly bounds-check the incoming data before copying it into fixed-size buffers within kernel memory. This classic buffer overflow condition occurs because the driver does not validate the length or structure of incoming infrared data, allowing an attacker to craft specially crafted packets that exceed the allocated buffer space. The overflow corrupts adjacent memory locations in the kernel address space, potentially leading to unpredictable behavior and system instability. According to CWE-121, this vulnerability maps to a classic stack-based buffer overflow scenario where insufficient bounds checking allows for memory corruption.
The operational impact of this vulnerability manifests as a denial of service condition that can force the target system to reboot or crash entirely. Since the attack requires physical proximity to the machine, it operates as a local privilege escalation vector that can be exploited by anyone within infrared transmission range, typically a few meters. This makes it particularly dangerous in environments where physical security is inadequate or where attackers can gain access to office spaces or restricted areas. The reboot effect occurs because the corrupted kernel memory causes the operating system to detect an invalid memory access and trigger a system crash or automatic restart to prevent further corruption. The attack does not require elevated privileges to execute, as it targets the kernel-level driver directly, making it accessible to any user with proximity to the target device.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on both immediate system hardening and long-term architectural improvements. System administrators should ensure that Windows 2000 systems are patched with the latest security updates from Microsoft, as this vulnerability was addressed in subsequent service packs and security releases. The most effective immediate mitigation involves disabling infrared communication capabilities entirely when not required, which can be accomplished through device manager settings or registry modifications that prevent the IrDA driver from loading. Additionally, implementing physical security measures such as restricting access to areas where infrared devices operate can significantly reduce the attack surface. Organizations should also consider network segmentation and monitoring to detect unusual infrared communication patterns that might indicate exploitation attempts. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability aligns with techniques involving privilege escalation and denial of service, specifically mapping to T1068 for local privilege escalation and T1499 for endpoint denial of service operations. The vulnerability demonstrates the importance of kernel-level security testing and input validation, as it highlights how seemingly benign communication protocols can become attack vectors when proper bounds checking is absent.