CVE-2002-0815 in Internet Explorer
Summary
by MITRE
The Javascript "Same Origin Policy" (SOP), as implemented in (1) Netscape, (2) Mozilla, and (3) Internet Explorer, allows a remote web server to access HTTP and SOAP/XML content from restricted sites by mapping the malicious server s parent DNS domain name to the restricted site, loading a page from the restricted site into one frame, and passing the information to the attacker-controlled frame, which is allowed because the document.domain of the two frames matches on the parent domain.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/07/2019
The vulnerability described in CVE-2002-0815 represents a critical security flaw in the implementation of the Same Origin Policy across major web browsers including Netscape, Mozilla, and Internet Explorer. This weakness fundamentally undermines the core security mechanism designed to prevent unauthorized cross-site scripting attacks by allowing malicious actors to bypass domain restriction controls through clever DNS manipulation techniques. The vulnerability operates by exploiting the way browsers handle document.domain properties when frames are loaded from different but related domains, creating a pathway for information leakage that violates fundamental web security principles.
The technical exploitation mechanism involves a sophisticated attack pattern where a remote web server maps its own parent DNS domain to match that of a restricted site, then loads content from the restricted domain into an embedded frame. This technique leverages the fact that browsers consider frames with matching parent domains to be from the same origin, despite the underlying content being from different subdomains or sites. The malicious server can then pass data between these frames using JavaScript, effectively enabling unauthorized access to HTTP and SOAP/XML content that should remain protected from cross-origin access attempts. This approach demonstrates how browser security policies can be circumvented through DNS-level manipulation rather than direct protocol exploitation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure to encompass potential full compromise of user sessions and sensitive data access. Attackers can leverage this weakness to harvest authentication tokens, session cookies, and other confidential information from restricted web applications, particularly those implementing SOAP-based web services or handling sensitive HTTP communications. The vulnerability affects not just individual users but entire organizations that rely on browser-based security models for protecting their web applications, making it a significant concern for enterprises with complex web infrastructures and multi-domain applications. This type of attack can be particularly devastating when targeting financial institutions, healthcare providers, or any organization handling personally identifiable information.
The security implications of CVE-2002-0815 align with CWE-94, which addresses the weakness of allowing code to be injected or executed in contexts where it should not be permitted, and relates to ATT&CK technique T1059.007 for script-based execution. This vulnerability demonstrates how browser security models can be subverted through indirect means rather than direct exploitation, highlighting the complexity of modern web security architectures. Organizations should implement comprehensive mitigations including strict content security policies, proper frame isolation mechanisms, and regular security audits of web applications to prevent exploitation of such cross-origin access vulnerabilities. The remediation approach must address both the browser-level implementation issues and the application-level security controls to prevent unauthorized cross-site data access through DNS manipulation techniques that exploit the Same Origin Policy's inherent weaknesses.
This vulnerability type represents a class of attacks that fall under the broader category of cross-site scripting and cross-origin data leakage, where the fundamental security assumptions of web browser implementations are violated through clever manipulation of domain relationships. The attack vector specifically targets the document.domain property handling in browsers, which should normally enforce strict origin boundaries but fails to properly validate the relationship between parent domains and their subdomains. The long-term impact of such vulnerabilities underscores the need for continuous security assessment and the importance of not relying solely on browser security models for protection of sensitive data in web applications.