CVE-2002-1776 in Norton Antivirus
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** NOTE: this issue has been disputed by the vendor. Symantec Norton AntiVirus 2002 allows remote attackers to bypass virus protection via a Word Macro virus with a .nch or .dbx extension, which is automatically recognized and executed as a Microsoft Office document. NOTE: the vendor has disputed this issue, acknowledging that the initial scan is bypassed, but the Office plug-in would detect the virus before it is executed.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/08/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2002-1776 relates to a disputed security flaw in Symantec Norton AntiVirus 2002 that could potentially allow remote attackers to circumvent antivirus protection mechanisms. This issue specifically involves the handling of Word Macro viruses with .nch or .dbx file extensions, which are automatically recognized and executed as Microsoft Office documents. The disputed nature of this vulnerability stems from the vendor's position that while the initial scan may be bypassed, the Office plug-in component would subsequently detect and prevent execution of the malicious code. This classification falls under the CWE-254 category of Security Features, specifically addressing weaknesses in protection mechanisms that allow unauthorized access or execution of malicious code.
The technical flaw in question centers on the improper handling of file extensions within the antivirus scanning process. When a Word Macro virus with a .nch or .dbx extension is encountered, the Norton AntiVirus 2002 system fails to properly identify these file types during the initial scan phase, allowing them to be processed as legitimate Microsoft Office documents. This creates a window of opportunity for attackers to execute malicious code before the system's secondary detection mechanisms can intervene. The vulnerability demonstrates a classic bypass scenario where primary security controls are circumvented, though the vendor acknowledges that subsequent layers of protection would eventually detect the threat. This behavior aligns with ATT&CK technique T1059.005 for Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically focusing on macro-based attacks that leverage Office applications.
The operational impact of this vulnerability, while disputed by the vendor, represents a significant concern for organizations relying on Norton AntiVirus 2002 for protection. The ability to bypass initial scanning mechanisms could allow attackers to execute malicious macros without detection during the first phase of execution, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further malware deployment. The vulnerability specifically affects environments where Microsoft Office documents are frequently handled, making it particularly dangerous in corporate settings where macro-based attacks are common. Organizations using this version of Norton AntiVirus would be at risk during the initial scan window before the Office plug-in detection can identify and block the malicious content. The vendor's acknowledgment that the issue involves bypassing the initial scan while confirming subsequent detection indicates a layered security approach where the primary flaw lies in the timing and completeness of the initial protection mechanism.
The mitigation strategies for this disputed vulnerability should focus on implementing additional security layers beyond the standard antivirus protection. Organizations should consider deploying network-based intrusion detection systems, implementing strict email filtering policies, and maintaining updated Office security settings that disable macro execution by default. The vendor's position that the Office plug-in would eventually detect the threat suggests that organizations should ensure all security components are properly configured and updated. This vulnerability highlights the importance of multi-layered security approaches and the necessity of keeping all security components current with the latest threat intelligence. Security administrators should also consider implementing endpoint detection and response solutions that can identify suspicious behavior patterns regardless of traditional signature-based detection methods. The disputed nature of this vulnerability emphasizes the need for continuous monitoring and verification of security controls, as vendor acknowledgments may not always reflect the complete risk landscape.