CVE-2002-1975 in Zaurus
Summary
by MITRE
Sharp Zaurus PDA SL-5000D and SL-5500 uses a salt of "A0" to encrypt the screen-locking password as stored in the Security.conf file, which makes it easier for local users to guess the password via brute force methods.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/16/2025
The vulnerability described in CVE-2002-1975 affects the Sharp Zaurus PDA series, specifically the SL-5000D and SL-5500 models, which represent early mobile computing devices from the early 2000s. These devices utilized a weak cryptographic implementation for protecting screen-locking passwords stored in the Security.conf configuration file. The fundamental flaw lies in the use of a fixed salt value of "A0" during the password encryption process, which significantly weakens the security posture of the device's authentication mechanism.
This cryptographic weakness stems from the improper implementation of password hashing as defined by the Common Weakness Enumeration standard CWE-326, which addresses the use of weak encryption algorithms and improper cryptographic practices. The fixed salt value creates predictable encryption patterns that eliminate the randomness essential for cryptographic security. When a password is encrypted using this method, the same salt value "A0" produces identical hash outputs for identical passwords, making the system vulnerable to various attack vectors including rainbow table attacks and brute force methodologies. The vulnerability directly impacts the system's ability to maintain confidentiality and integrity of user authentication data.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for users of these devices, as it creates an easily exploitable weakness that allows local attackers to systematically guess passwords through brute force techniques. The predictable nature of the encryption process means that attackers can precompute hash values for common passwords and quickly identify valid credentials without requiring extensive computational resources. This vulnerability essentially undermines the core security principle of authentication by providing attackers with a streamlined path to compromise user accounts. The attack surface is further expanded due to the device's nature as a personal digital assistant that typically operates in environments where local physical access may be obtained.
The mitigation strategies for this vulnerability are limited due to the embedded nature of the firmware and the age of the affected devices. The most effective approach involves implementing proper cryptographic practices such as using unique, random salts for each password hashing operation, which would align with the recommendations found in the NIST Special Publication 800-132 guidelines for password storage. Additionally, organizations should consider implementing multi-factor authentication mechanisms to compensate for the inherent weakness in the password encryption scheme. The vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of proper cryptographic implementation even in embedded systems, as highlighted in the MITRE ATT&CK framework's emphasis on credential access techniques and the exploitation of weak encryption mechanisms. Given the age of these devices, the most practical solution involves disabling the screen lock functionality or implementing external authentication mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to the compromised systems.