CVE-2002-2049 in Dsniff
Summary
by MITRE
configure for Dsniff 2.3, fragroute 1.2, and fragrouter 1.6, when downloaded from monkey.org on May 17, 2002, has been modified to contain a backdoor, which allows remote attackers to access the system.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/08/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2002-2049 represents a sophisticated supply chain attack that compromised the integrity of widely used network security tools. This backdoor was embedded within the configuration process of three critical network analysis utilities: Dsniff version 2.3, Fragroute version 1.2, and Fragrouter version 1.6. The attack specifically targeted the download distribution channel from monkey.org, which was a primary source for these security tools during the early 2000s. The compromise occurred on May 17, 2002, when the configure script for these packages was maliciously modified to include unauthorized code that would establish unauthorized remote access capabilities. This represents a classic case of malicious code insertion at the software distribution level, where attackers exploited the trust relationship between users and legitimate software repositories.
The technical flaw in this vulnerability stems from the lack of proper code integrity verification mechanisms within the software distribution process. When users downloaded and executed the configure script for these packages, they unknowingly executed malicious code that would create a backdoor on the target system. The backdoor allowed remote attackers to gain unauthorized access and control over compromised systems, essentially transforming legitimate network security tools into vehicles for malicious activity. This type of vulnerability aligns with CWE-494, which describes the risk of accepting or executing untrusted code, and also relates to CWE-22, representing the potential for path traversal attacks that could enable unauthorized code execution. The compromised configure script likely contained code that would establish a listening port or create a reverse shell, providing persistent access to the attacker.
The operational impact of this vulnerability was significant for network security professionals and organizations that relied on these tools for their security infrastructure. System administrators and security researchers who downloaded and installed these compromised packages inadvertently installed malicious software that could be used to conduct further attacks or maintain persistent access to networks. The backdoor would have remained undetected for extended periods, as it was embedded within legitimate software that users trusted and regularly used for network analysis and security testing. This vulnerability demonstrated the critical importance of software integrity verification and highlighted how attackers could exploit the trust placed in established software repositories to compromise entire networks. The incident also underscored the need for proper cryptographic signatures and checksum verification processes that were not commonly implemented during this era of software distribution.
The mitigation strategies for this vulnerability required immediate action from affected users, including immediate removal of the compromised packages, system scanning for backdoor presence, and verification of software integrity through alternative sources. Organizations needed to implement proper software verification procedures, including cryptographic signature validation and checksum verification, before installing any software from external sources. The incident led to increased awareness of supply chain security risks and prompted development of better software integrity verification mechanisms. Security professionals were advised to maintain updated lists of known good software hashes and to establish secure distribution channels for critical security tools. This vulnerability also contributed to the evolution of security practices around software verification and the importance of maintaining air-gapped environments for critical security infrastructure. The incident served as a foundational example of how supply chain attacks could compromise even the most trusted security tools, ultimately influencing the development of more robust software integrity verification standards that would become standard practice in the cybersecurity community.