CVE-2003-1035 in SAP
Summary
by MITRE
The default installation of SAP R/3 46C/D allows remote attackers to bypass account locking by using the RFC API instead of the SAPGUI to conduct a brute force password guessing attack, which does not lock out the account like the SAPGUI does.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/06/2017
The vulnerability described in CVE-2003-1035 represents a significant security flaw in SAP R/3 46C/D systems that exploits inconsistent account lockout mechanisms across different authentication interfaces. This issue stems from the fundamental design difference between the SAPGUI client interface and the RFC (Remote Function Call) API implementation within the SAP ecosystem. When users attempt authentication through the standard SAPGUI, the system properly enforces account lockout policies after a predetermined number of failed login attempts, thereby preventing brute force attacks from succeeding. However, the RFC API implementation fails to enforce these same account lockout mechanisms, creating a critical bypass vector that attackers can exploit to conduct extended password guessing campaigns without triggering the protective account lockout features.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability lies in the inconsistent enforcement of authentication policies across different SAP communication channels. The RFC API operates under different security contexts compared to the SAPGUI interface, resulting in disparate handling of failed authentication attempts. This inconsistency creates a scenario where the system's account lockout logic is effectively disabled for RFC-based authentication attempts, allowing attackers to perform unlimited password guessing attempts against user accounts. The vulnerability specifically affects the default installation configuration of SAP R/3 46C/D systems, indicating that this was not a configuration issue but rather a fundamental flaw in the system's authentication architecture that existed out-of-the-box.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability enables attackers to conduct prolonged brute force attacks against SAP user accounts without fear of account lockout protection mechanisms. The ability to bypass account locking significantly increases the probability of successful password guessing and credential compromise, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive business data and critical system functions. The vulnerability affects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of SAP systems by providing attackers with a persistent method to gain unauthorized access. Organizations using default SAP R/3 46C/D installations face heightened risk of data breaches, system compromise, and potential regulatory violations due to the exposure of this authentication bypass mechanism.
Security professionals should note that this vulnerability aligns with CWE-614, which addresses the issue of sensitive data exposure through improper authentication handling, and demonstrates characteristics consistent with ATT&CK technique T1110.003 for Brute Force Attacks. The recommended mitigations include implementing custom account lockout policies that enforce consistent behavior across all authentication interfaces, configuring RFC-specific security controls, and applying SAP security patches that address the authentication inconsistency. Organizations should also consider implementing additional security controls such as network segmentation, monitoring for unusual authentication patterns, and enforcing multi-factor authentication for critical SAP accounts to reduce the risk associated with this vulnerability. The vulnerability underscores the importance of comprehensive security testing across all authentication channels and the need for consistent security policy enforcement throughout enterprise systems.
This vulnerability represents a classic example of how default configurations can introduce security gaps that attackers can exploit. The fact that it affects the default installation of SAP R/3 46C/D systems indicates that organizations implementing SAP solutions without proper security hardening are particularly vulnerable to this type of attack. The security community has historically identified similar issues in enterprise systems where different interfaces or protocols fail to maintain consistent security controls, making this vulnerability particularly concerning for organizations with SAP implementations that have not been properly secured.