CVE-2004-0155 in Racoon
Summary
by MITRE
The KAME IKE Daemon Racoon, when authenticating a peer during Phase 1, validates the X.509 certificate but does not verify the RSA signature authentication, which allows remote attackers to establish unauthorized IP connections or conduct man-in-the-middle attacks using a valid, trusted X.509 certificate.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/16/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2004-0155 affects the KAME IKE Daemon Racoon implementation of the Internet Key Exchange protocol, specifically during Phase 1 authentication processes. This represents a critical security flaw that undermines the integrity of the authentication mechanism by bypassing crucial signature verification steps. The vulnerability stems from the daemon's failure to validate RSA signatures associated with X.509 certificates presented during peer authentication, creating a significant attack surface that adversaries can exploit to compromise secure communications. The issue manifests when Racoon receives a certificate from a peer, properly validates the certificate's trust chain and identity information, but fails to cryptographically verify the RSA signature that binds the certificate to its issuer. This cryptographic oversight allows attackers to craft malicious certificate responses that pass the validation checks while maintaining the appearance of legitimate authentication.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability enables remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks by presenting a valid X.509 certificate that has been properly issued and trusted by the system, but without proper RSA signature verification. This flaw directly violates the fundamental principles of public key infrastructure where cryptographic signatures serve as the primary mechanism for verifying certificate authenticity and integrity. The attack vector leverages the fact that while the certificate validation process confirms the certificate's presence in the trust store and validates its basic attributes, it fails to ensure that the certificate's signature was generated by the legitimate private key of the issuing authority. This creates a scenario where an attacker can manipulate the authentication process to establish unauthorized IP connections, potentially gaining access to sensitive network resources or intercepting communications between legitimate parties.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability poses severe risks to network security infrastructure that relies on IPsec for secure communications. The ability to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks through certificate manipulation undermines the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of protected network communications. Organizations implementing Racoon-based IPsec solutions face potential exposure to unauthorized access, data interception, and network disruption. The vulnerability affects the core authentication mechanisms that protect VPN connections, secure remote access, and encrypted network communications, making it particularly dangerous for enterprises that depend on IPsec for network security. The attack can be executed remotely without requiring local system access or elevated privileges, making it accessible to a broad range of threat actors and increasing the potential impact across multiple network segments.
The vulnerability aligns with CWE-327, which addresses the use of weak or broken cryptographic algorithms, and specifically relates to the improper implementation of signature verification processes within certificate-based authentication systems. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this weakness maps to techniques involving credential access through manipulation of authentication mechanisms and network protocol manipulation. The flaw represents a failure in the authentication integrity verification process and can be categorized under credential compromise and network infiltration techniques. Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including updating to patched versions of Racoon, implementing additional authentication layers, and monitoring for suspicious certificate validation patterns. The recommended remediation involves ensuring that all certificate validations include proper RSA signature verification and that cryptographic implementations follow established security standards such as those specified in RFC 4108 and RFC 5280 for certificate validation processes. Additionally, network administrators should consider implementing certificate pinning mechanisms and enhanced monitoring of authentication events to detect potential exploitation attempts.