CVE-2004-0679 in UnrealIRCd
Summary
by MITRE
The IP cloaking feature (cloak.c) in UnrealIRCd 3.2, and possibly other versions, uses a weak hashing scheme to hide IP addresses, which could allow remote attackers to use brute force methods to gain other user s IP addresses.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/29/2018
The vulnerability described in CVE-2004-0679 represents a critical weakness in the UnrealIRCd 3.2 server implementation that directly impacts user privacy and network security. This issue specifically affects the IP cloaking functionality, which is designed to obscure users' true IP addresses from other network participants. The cloak.c module implements a hashing mechanism that fails to provide adequate cryptographic security, creating a significant exposure in the IRC network infrastructure. This weakness allows malicious actors to systematically reverse-engineer obscured IP addresses through brute force attacks, effectively undermining the privacy protections that users expect when connecting to IRC networks.
The technical flaw stems from the implementation of a weak hashing algorithm within the IP cloaking feature that does not adequately protect against cryptographic attacks. According to CWE-327, this vulnerability represents a use of a broken or weak cryptographic algorithm, where the hashing scheme lacks sufficient entropy and computational complexity to resist reverse engineering attempts. The implementation fails to meet minimum security requirements for cryptographic functions, making it susceptible to various attack vectors including rainbow table attacks and brute force methodologies. The hash function likely uses predictable patterns or insufficient bit lengths that allow attackers to correlate cloaked addresses with their original IP addresses through systematic computational approaches.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privacy concerns to potentially enable more sophisticated attacks against IRC network participants. When attackers successfully determine users' true IP addresses, they can launch targeted attacks against specific hosts, conduct location-based reconnaissance, or correlate user activities across multiple platforms. This vulnerability directly impacts the security posture of IRC networks by creating a vector for passive reconnaissance that could lead to further exploitation attempts. The ability to map cloaked IP addresses to real network locations compromises the fundamental security model that IRC networks rely on for user protection. According to ATT&CK framework category T1592, this vulnerability enables adversary reconnaissance activities that would otherwise be difficult to perform through standard network scanning techniques.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both the immediate implementation flaw and the broader security implications for IRC network operations. The most effective solution involves implementing a strong cryptographic hash function with sufficient entropy and computational complexity that resists brute force attacks. Organizations should consider upgrading to modern IRC server implementations that have addressed this weakness, as UnrealIRCd 3.2 represents an outdated version with known security vulnerabilities. Network administrators should also implement additional monitoring and logging mechanisms to detect unusual patterns of IP address correlation attempts. The remediation process requires careful consideration of backward compatibility while ensuring that cryptographic implementations meet current security standards. Security teams should also consider implementing network-level protections such as rate limiting and access controls to prevent automated brute force attacks against the IP cloaking functionality.