CVE-2004-2079 in Red-Alert
Summary
by MITRE
Red-M Red-Alert 2.7.5 with software 3.1 build 24 binds authentication to IP addresses, which allows remote attackers to bypass authentication by connecting from the same IP address as an active authenticated user.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/17/2018
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2004-2079 affects Red-M Red-Alert 2.7.5 software version 3.1 build 24, representing a significant authentication flaw that undermines the security posture of network monitoring and intrusion detection systems. This issue stems from the software's implementation of IP address binding for authentication mechanisms, creating a dangerous precedent where legitimate access can be exploited by unauthorized parties through simple IP address reuse. The vulnerability specifically targets the authentication process within the Red-Alert system, which is designed to monitor and alert on network activities, making it a critical concern for organizations relying on such security infrastructure.
The technical flaw manifests in the software's session management architecture where authentication tokens or credentials become tied to specific IP addresses rather than implementing proper session isolation mechanisms. When an authenticated user establishes a connection to the Red-Alert system, the software creates a session that is permanently bound to that user's IP address. This design choice violates fundamental security principles of session management and creates a scenario where any remote attacker who can determine or guess the IP address of an active authenticated session can simply connect from the same address to gain unauthorized access. The vulnerability operates under the weakness category of CWE-287, which addresses improper handling of authentication tokens, and demonstrates a clear violation of the principle of least privilege in network security.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple unauthorized access, as it fundamentally compromises the integrity of the intrusion detection system's security model. Attackers can exploit this weakness to gain administrative privileges without proper authentication, potentially allowing them to manipulate security alerts, disable monitoring capabilities, or even modify the system's configuration to hide their activities. This type of attack represents a classic case of credential hijacking or session fixation that could enable persistent threats within network environments. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it affects network security tools that are expected to provide robust protection, creating a false sense of security for organizations that rely on Red-Alert for monitoring their network perimeters. From an attacker's perspective, this vulnerability aligns with techniques described in the ATT&CK framework under the credential access and privilege escalation domains, specifically targeting the use of valid credentials in unauthorized contexts.
Organizations affected by this vulnerability should immediately implement network segmentation and access controls to limit exposure, while also considering the deployment of additional authentication layers such as multi-factor authentication or certificate-based authentication to mitigate the risk. The recommended mitigation strategies include implementing proper session management that does not tie authentication to static IP addresses, establishing dynamic IP address validation mechanisms, and deploying network access control lists that restrict access based on more granular criteria than simple IP address matching. Security professionals should also consider implementing network monitoring solutions that can detect anomalous connection patterns and IP address reuse that might indicate exploitation attempts. The vulnerability serves as a reminder of the critical importance of proper session management in security applications and highlights the necessity of adhering to established security frameworks and standards when designing authentication mechanisms for network monitoring and intrusion detection systems.