CVE-2004-2507 in WVC11B
Summary
by MITRE
Absolute path traversal vulnerability in main.cgi in Linksys WVC11B Wireless-B Internet Video Camera allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via an absolute pathname in the next_file parameter.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/05/2025
The CVE-2004-2507 vulnerability represents a critical absolute path traversal flaw in the Linksys WVC11B Wireless-B Internet Video Camera's main.cgi web application component. This vulnerability specifically affects the handling of the next_file parameter within the camera's web interface, which processes user-supplied input without adequate validation or sanitization. The flaw exists in the camera's firmware implementation where the application directly incorporates user-provided absolute pathnames into file system operations without proper input filtering or access control mechanisms.
This vulnerability operates through a classic path traversal attack vector where malicious actors can manipulate the next_file parameter to specify arbitrary absolute file paths on the device's file system. The WVC11B camera, designed for remote internet video monitoring, exposes its web interface on port 80, making it accessible over the network. When an attacker submits a crafted absolute pathname through the next_file parameter, the main.cgi script processes this input and attempts to access the specified file location. Since the application lacks proper input validation and path sanitization, it becomes possible to traverse the file system and access sensitive files that should remain protected.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple file reading capabilities. An attacker can potentially access configuration files, authentication credentials, system logs, and other sensitive data stored on the camera's file system. This exposure creates a significant risk for network security as the camera becomes a potential entry point for further attacks within the local network. The vulnerability affects the camera's authentication model, as it allows unauthorized access to system resources regardless of user credentials, effectively bypassing the device's access control mechanisms. This weakness aligns with CWE-22, which describes improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory, commonly known as path traversal or directory traversal vulnerabilities.
The attack surface for this vulnerability is particularly concerning given the nature of network video cameras and their typical deployment in both residential and commercial environments. These devices often store sensitive information including user credentials, network configuration details, and video recordings that could be valuable to attackers. The vulnerability's exploitation requires minimal technical expertise, making it attractive to a broad range of threat actors including script kiddies and organized cybercriminals. The lack of input validation in the main.cgi script represents a fundamental security flaw in the device's architecture, as it fails to implement proper access control and input sanitization measures that should be standard in embedded web applications.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2004-2507 should include immediate firmware updates from Linksys if available, network segmentation to isolate the camera from critical systems, and implementation of network access controls through firewalls and access control lists. Organizations should consider disabling unnecessary web interfaces on the device and implementing proper network monitoring to detect unusual access patterns. The vulnerability demonstrates the importance of secure coding practices in embedded systems and highlights the need for input validation and access control mechanisms. From an ATT&CK perspective, this vulnerability maps to T1071.004 for application layer protocol and T1566 for credential access, as it enables unauthorized access to system information and potentially authentication credentials stored on the device. The long-term solution requires manufacturers to implement robust input validation, proper path restriction mechanisms, and comprehensive security testing for all web-facing components in networked devices.