CVE-2005-1052 in Outlook
Summary
by MITRE
Microsoft Outlook 2003 and Outlook Web Access (OWA) 2003 do not properly display comma separated addresses in the From field in an e-mail message, which could allow remote attackers to spoof e-mail addresses.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/07/2018
Microsoft Outlook 2003 and Outlook Web Access 2003 suffered from a critical display vulnerability that manifested when processing comma-separated email addresses in the From field of messages. This flaw originated from improper handling of email address formatting during message rendering, specifically when multiple addresses were concatenated with commas. The vulnerability created a deceptive user interface condition where attackers could craft malicious email messages with carefully formatted From fields that would appear to originate from legitimate addresses while actually containing spoofed addresses. This issue represented a significant security concern as it undermined the fundamental trust mechanism of email authentication and could enable social engineering attacks, phishing attempts, and reputation-based impersonation. The vulnerability was classified under CWE-20 as improper input validation, specifically involving the handling of email address formats during display operations. From an operational perspective, this flaw allowed attackers to exploit the visual representation of email addresses to deceive users into believing messages originated from trusted sources. The impact extended beyond simple address spoofing, as it could facilitate more sophisticated attacks where attackers manipulated the From field to appear as if messages came from internal colleagues, trusted vendors, or official organizations. The vulnerability was particularly dangerous in enterprise environments where users relied on email address verification for security decisions. Attackers could leverage this weakness to bypass basic email security controls and increase the success rate of phishing campaigns. The flaw was consistent across both desktop and web-based email clients, making it particularly challenging to defend against as users could be targeted regardless of their email access method. Security professionals noted this vulnerability as a prime example of how user interface rendering issues could create security risks, aligning with ATT&CK technique T1566 for credential harvesting through spearphishing. The vulnerability demonstrated the importance of proper input sanitization and validation in email processing applications. Organizations implementing email security solutions needed to account for this display-level spoofing capability, as traditional spam filters and authentication mechanisms might not detect malicious content when the issue occurred at the presentation layer. The security community recognized this as a critical flaw requiring immediate attention, as it directly compromised user trust and email security assumptions. Remediation efforts focused on updating email client applications and implementing additional validation layers to prevent malformed address displays from occurring. This vulnerability highlighted the complexity of email security where issues could arise from seemingly benign display functions rather than core protocol implementations. The flaw served as a reminder that security considerations must be comprehensive, encompassing not only data processing but also user interface rendering and presentation aspects of email applications.