CVE-2005-1574 in Windows Media Player
Summary
by MITRE
Windows Media Player 9 and 10, in certain cases, allows content protected by Windows Media Digital Rights Management (WMDRM) to redirect the user to a web site to obtain a license, even when the "Acquire licenses automatically for protected content" setting is not enabled.
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/02/2025
This vulnerability in Windows Media Player 9 and 10 represents a significant bypass of digital rights management protections that violates fundamental security principles governing media content licensing. The flaw operates through a design weakness in the WMDRM implementation where the player fails to respect user configuration settings that should prevent automatic license acquisition. This behavior creates an unexpected communication channel that can be exploited by malicious actors to establish unauthorized network connections. The vulnerability stems from improper validation of user preferences within the media player's license acquisition process, allowing the system to override local security configurations without user consent.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involves the WMDRM subsystem within Windows Media Player making network requests to license servers regardless of the user's explicit settings. When protected content is encountered, the player initiates a license acquisition sequence that bypasses the configured automatic license setting, potentially sending identifying information about the user and content to remote servers. This behavior creates a potential attack surface where malicious actors could leverage the automatic redirect functionality to deliver malware or collect user data. The flaw specifically manifests when the player encounters content that requires license validation, even though the user has explicitly disabled automatic license acquisition through the player's configuration interface.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability undermines the security model that users rely upon when configuring their media player settings. The automatic redirection can lead to unauthorized data collection, potential malware delivery, and privacy violations that extend beyond the intended scope of the media player's functionality. Security researchers have classified this as a configuration bypass vulnerability where user security preferences are ignored, creating a persistent threat vector that can be exploited by attackers. The vulnerability also represents a failure in the principle of least privilege, as the media player demonstrates behavior that exceeds the user's explicit authorization. Network administrators and security professionals must recognize that this flaw can be leveraged in targeted attacks where malicious content is designed to trigger the automatic license acquisition process, potentially leading to full system compromise through the network connections established.
Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including disabling Windows Media Player functionality or implementing network monitoring to detect unauthorized outbound connections. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-693, which addresses protection mechanism failures, and can be mapped to ATT&CK technique T1071.004 for application layer protocol: web protocols, as it involves unauthorized network communications. Users should be educated about the potential risks of automatic license acquisition and the importance of maintaining updated security configurations. Microsoft addressed this issue through security updates that corrected the license acquisition behavior, requiring explicit user consent for network communications. The vulnerability serves as a reminder of the critical importance of proper configuration management and the need for robust security testing of media and entertainment software to prevent unintended functionality that can be exploited by threat actors.