CVE-2005-1601 in Maximo Self Service
Summary
by MITRE
MRO Maximo Self Service 4 and 5 stores certain information under the web document root using file extensions that are not processed by Tomcat, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via a direct request for the file, such as MXServer.properties.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/25/2017
The vulnerability described in CVE-2005-1601 affects MRO Maximo Self Service versions 4 and 5, representing a critical information disclosure flaw that stems from improper file handling within the web application's document root. This issue manifests when sensitive configuration files are stored in directories accessible through the web server without proper access controls or processing restrictions. The affected system stores configuration information using file extensions that Tomcat does not process, meaning these files are served directly to clients without any server-side interpretation or filtering. This misconfiguration creates an attack vector where remote adversaries can directly request these files through HTTP, bypassing normal application security mechanisms and gaining unauthorized access to sensitive data. The specific file mentioned in the vulnerability description is MXServer.properties, which typically contains critical configuration parameters, database connection details, and potentially authentication credentials that should remain protected from unauthorized access.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability aligns with CWE-545, which describes the use of insecure direct object references in web applications, and CWE-200, which covers information exposure through improper error handling. The flaw operates through a combination of weak access control mechanisms and improper file system permissions within the web application's deployment structure. When the application places sensitive files in directories that are directly accessible through the web server, it violates fundamental security principles of least privilege and proper resource isolation. The vulnerability specifically exploits the fact that Tomcat serves files with certain extensions directly without processing them, allowing attackers to bypass the application's normal request handling and security layers. This direct file access pattern represents a classic example of insecure file permissions and improper web server configuration, where administrative or sensitive files are stored in publicly accessible directories without appropriate security controls.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability presents significant risks to organizations using affected versions of MRO Maximo Self Service, as it provides attackers with immediate access to critical system configuration information. The MXServer.properties file typically contains database connection strings, encryption keys, and other sensitive parameters that could enable further attacks including database exploitation, privilege escalation, or lateral movement within the network. Attackers could leverage this information to craft more sophisticated attacks against the underlying database systems or to impersonate legitimate application components. The remote nature of this vulnerability means that attackers do not require local access or physical presence to exploit the flaw, making it particularly dangerous as it can be exploited from anywhere on the internet. This type of information disclosure vulnerability often serves as a stepping stone for more complex attacks, as the leaked configuration data provides attackers with insights into the system architecture and potential attack vectors.
Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including moving sensitive configuration files outside of the web document root and ensuring that all files containing sensitive information are properly secured through access controls and file permissions. The recommended approach involves reconfiguring the web server to prevent direct access to sensitive directories and implementing proper file extension handling to ensure that configuration files are not served directly to clients. Security controls should include configuring Tomcat to reject requests for specific file extensions that contain sensitive information or implementing URL rewriting rules that prevent access to these files through normal HTTP requests. Additionally, organizations should conduct comprehensive security assessments of their web application deployments to identify any other sensitive files that might be stored in publicly accessible locations. This vulnerability also highlights the importance of following security best practices such as the principle of least privilege and proper separation of concerns in web application architecture, which aligns with ATT&CK technique T1566 for credential access and T1083 for file and directory discovery. Regular security audits and penetration testing should be conducted to ensure that no sensitive information is inadvertently exposed through improper file system permissions or web server configurations.