CVE-2006-4991 in Keon Certificate Authority Manager
Summary
by MITRE
RSA Keon Certificate Authority (KeonCA) Manager 6.5.1 and 6.6 allows privileged local users to hide malicious Certificate Authority (CA) activities by modifying CA auditor logs without detection by (1) modifying or deleting a <LOG BLOCK> and its signature from the XML log in a way that is not detected by the integrity check function that operates on the entire pool, or (2) modifying entries in the live log file, which is only signed during rotation.
If you want to get the best quality for vulnerability data then you always have to consider VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/24/2017
The vulnerability described in CVE-2006-4991 represents a critical security flaw in RSA Keon Certificate Authority Manager versions 6.5.1 and 6.6 that undermines the fundamental integrity and auditability of certificate authority operations. This weakness specifically targets the logging and auditing mechanisms that are essential for maintaining trust in cryptographic infrastructure, creating a scenario where malicious actors with privileged local access can effectively erase their tracks within the certificate authority system. The vulnerability stems from inadequate integrity validation mechanisms that fail to properly verify the consistency and authenticity of audit logs throughout the entire logging process, allowing for undetected modifications that compromise the security posture of the entire certificate authority infrastructure.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability exploits two distinct but related attack vectors that bypass the system's integrity checking mechanisms. The first vector involves modifying or deleting specific <LOG BLOCK> elements and their associated signatures within the XML log structure without triggering detection by the integrity check function that operates on the entire pool. This approach demonstrates a fundamental flaw in the cryptographic validation process where the system's verification mechanism fails to properly validate individual log blocks against their signatures, allowing attackers to manipulate the log content while maintaining the appearance of integrity. The second vector targets the live log file which operates under a different security model where entries are only signed during rotation, creating a window of opportunity for attackers to modify active log entries before the next signing operation occurs.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple audit log manipulation, as it fundamentally compromises the trust model that certificate authorities rely upon to maintain security. When privileged local users can hide malicious activities without detection, it creates a false sense of security for system administrators and stakeholders who depend on these audit trails for security monitoring and forensic analysis. This vulnerability directly violates the principles of auditability and non-repudiation that are core to certificate authority operations, as defined by standards such as iso/iec 15408 common criteria and the x.509 certificate standard. The ability to modify audit logs without detection creates a significant risk for security incidents that might otherwise be detected through normal monitoring procedures, effectively rendering the audit trail useless for forensic purposes and potentially allowing malicious actors to conduct prolonged unauthorized activities.
From a cybersecurity perspective, this vulnerability aligns with several attack patterns documented in the mitre att&ck framework, particularly those related to privilege escalation and defense evasion techniques. The attack scenario represents a sophisticated form of audit log tampering that bypasses standard security controls and could be classified under techniques such as "modify existing service" and "indicator removal on host." The vulnerability also demonstrates weaknesses in the principle of least privilege and proper access control implementation, as it allows local users with privileged access to subvert the integrity checking mechanisms that should protect against such modifications. Organizations implementing certificate authority systems must recognize that this vulnerability creates a persistent threat vector that can remain undetected for extended periods, potentially allowing attackers to compromise the entire certificate authority infrastructure.
The recommended mitigations for this vulnerability focus on strengthening the integrity checking mechanisms and implementing more robust logging architectures that prevent the types of modifications described in the vulnerability. System administrators should implement additional verification steps that validate individual log entries against their cryptographic signatures before accepting any modifications, rather than relying solely on pool-level integrity checks. The logging system should be redesigned to ensure that live log entries are cryptographically signed at the time of creation rather than during rotation, eliminating the window of opportunity for attackers to modify active entries. Additionally, organizations should implement independent auditing mechanisms that can validate the integrity of the certificate authority's audit logs through external verification processes, providing a second line of defense against such tampering attempts. These mitigations align with best practices outlined in the iso/iec 27001 information security management standard and the nist cybersecurity framework for maintaining the integrity of critical security infrastructure components.