CVE-2006-6476 in First Response
Summary
by MITRE
FRAgent.exe in Mandiant First Response (MFR) before 1.1.1, when run in daemon mode and when the agent is bound to 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces), opens sockets in non-exclusive mode, which allows local users to hijack the socket, and capture data or cause a denial of service (loss of daemon operation).
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/12/2019
The vulnerability described in CVE-2006-6476 affects Mandiant First Response (MFR) software version 1.1.0 and earlier, specifically targeting the FRAgent.exe component when operating in daemon mode. This issue arises from improper socket configuration that creates security implications for systems running this forensic analysis tool. The vulnerability occurs when the agent is configured to bind to 0.0.0.0, which represents all available network interfaces on the host system. This configuration pattern is commonly used in daemon applications to ensure accessibility across all network interfaces, but in this case, it creates a dangerous operational flaw.
The technical flaw stems from the socket binding mechanism within FRAgent.exe where sockets are opened in non-exclusive mode rather than exclusive mode. When sockets operate in non-exclusive mode, they allow multiple processes or users to bind to the same network address and port combination. This behavior creates a race condition and privilege escalation opportunity for local users who can exploit the socket binding to intercept network traffic intended for the legitimate daemon process. The vulnerability operates at the network layer of the system, specifically affecting the transport layer socket management functions that are fundamental to network communication protocols.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant as it provides local users with the ability to perform man-in-the-middle attacks against the MFR daemon. Attackers can hijack the socket connections to capture sensitive data being transmitted through the forensic analysis tool, potentially accessing forensic evidence, system information, or other confidential data processed by the daemon. Additionally, the vulnerability can be exploited to cause denial of service conditions by disrupting the daemon's network operations, which would prevent legitimate forensic analysis activities from completing successfully. This creates a critical risk for organizations relying on MFR for digital forensics and incident response operations where maintaining data integrity and availability is paramount.
From a cybersecurity framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to CWE-119 Improper Access Control and CWE-120 Buffer Overflow, as the improper socket handling creates access control issues that can lead to data interception. The attack pattern aligns with ATT&CK technique T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS, where network communication interception occurs, and T1499.004 Endpoint Denial of Service, which addresses service disruption attacks. Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including updating to MFR version 1.1.1 or later, configuring the agent to bind to specific interfaces rather than 0.0.0.0, and ensuring proper access controls are in place to limit local user privileges. Network monitoring should be enhanced to detect unusual socket binding patterns, and system administrators should conduct regular security assessments to identify and remediate similar socket configuration vulnerabilities in other network services.
The root cause analysis reveals that this vulnerability stems from inadequate socket programming practices where exclusive binding was not enforced during daemon initialization. This represents a classic security misconfiguration that could have been prevented through proper secure coding practices and adherence to network security principles. The vulnerability demonstrates how seemingly minor configuration decisions in daemon applications can create significant security implications, particularly when dealing with network services that handle sensitive forensic data. Organizations should establish security guidelines requiring exclusive socket binding for all daemon processes and implement automated scanning tools to identify similar vulnerabilities across their network infrastructure.