CVE-2006-6622 in Antihook
Summary
by MITRE
Soft4Ever Look n Stop (LnS) 2.05p2 before 20061215 relies on the Process Environment Block (PEB) to identify a process, which allows local users to bypass the product s controls on a process by spoofing the (1) ImagePathName, (2) CommandLine, and (3) WindowTitle fields in the PEB.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/10/2018
The vulnerability described in CVE-2006-6622 affects Soft4Ever Look n Stop version 2.05p2 and earlier releases, specifically targeting the software's process identification mechanism that relies on the Windows Process Environment Block. This security flaw represents a significant weakness in the product's access control implementation, as it demonstrates how an attacker can manipulate core system structures to evade security controls. The vulnerability stems from the software's dependency on PEB fields for process validation, creating an attack surface where malicious actors can exploit the trust placed in these system-level identifiers. This type of vulnerability falls under the category of privilege escalation and access control bypass, where local users can circumvent the intended security boundaries of the application.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involves the manipulation of three critical fields within the Process Environment Block structure: ImagePathName, CommandLine, and WindowTitle. These fields contain information about the process executable path, command line arguments, and window title respectively, which the Look n Stop software uses to make security decisions about process access. By spoofing these fields, an attacker can present false information to the security application, causing it to incorrectly identify processes and grant unauthorized access or bypass established controls. The PEB structure is a fundamental component of Windows process management that contains various process-related information, making this attack vector particularly effective because it targets core operating system functionality rather than application-specific code. This approach aligns with techniques described in the ATT&CK framework under process injection and privilege escalation tactics, where adversaries manipulate process metadata to evade detection and access controls.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple access bypass, as it fundamentally undermines the security model of the Look n Stop application. Local users who exploit this vulnerability can effectively gain unauthorized access to system resources that should be restricted, potentially leading to privilege escalation, data compromise, or system integrity violations. The attack requires local system access and knowledge of Windows internals, making it a medium-severity threat that can be particularly dangerous in environments where local users have elevated privileges. This vulnerability represents a classic case of trust exploitation, where the software's security relies on the integrity of system structures that can be manipulated by determined attackers. The implications are significant for system administrators who rely on such security tools to protect against unauthorized process access and maintain system security boundaries.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on both immediate patching and architectural improvements to process identification mechanisms. The most effective immediate solution is to apply the vendor-provided update released after December 15, 2006, which addresses the PEB manipulation issue by implementing more robust process validation techniques. Organizations should also consider implementing additional monitoring and detection measures that can identify suspicious process behavior patterns, even when traditional PEB-based identification fails. Security professionals should implement the principle of least privilege and ensure that local user accounts have minimal access to critical system functions. The vulnerability demonstrates the importance of not relying solely on system-level metadata for security decisions, and instead implementing multi-layered validation approaches that can withstand manipulation of individual components. This aligns with security best practices outlined in standards such as NIST SP 800-53, which emphasizes the need for robust access control mechanisms that can resist various forms of attack including metadata manipulation. Organizations should also consider implementing behavioral analysis tools that can detect anomalous process activities regardless of PEB field values, providing defense in depth against similar types of vulnerabilities.