CVE-2006-7200 in RSA Security SiteKey
Summary
by MITRE
EMC RSA Security SiteKey issues challenge-bypass tokens that persist forever without a cancellation interface for end users, which makes it easier for attackers to bypass one stage of authentication by stealing and replaying a token.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/14/2017
The vulnerability described in CVE-2006-7200 pertains to a critical flaw in EMC RSA Security SiteKey authentication system that fundamentally undermines the security posture of the affected environment. This issue represents a significant weakness in the authentication infrastructure where challenge-bypass tokens are issued without any mechanism for revocation or cancellation by end users. The persistent nature of these tokens creates a persistent security risk that extends far beyond typical session management concerns, as the tokens remain valid indefinitely until manually removed from the system.
The technical flaw manifests in the absence of a proper token lifecycle management system within the RSA Security SiteKey implementation. When users receive challenge-bypass tokens, they are not provided with any interface or process to invalidate these tokens should they become compromised or no longer needed. This design oversight directly violates fundamental security principles regarding credential management and access control. The tokens function as persistent authentication credentials that can be stolen, stored, and replayed at will by attackers without any built-in mechanism to detect or prevent such misuse.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability creates a substantial attack surface that allows adversaries to bypass one stage of authentication through simple token theft and replay attacks. The persistence of these tokens means that even if a legitimate user's session expires or their device is compromised, attackers can continue to leverage the stolen tokens indefinitely. This creates a scenario where a single stolen token can provide persistent unauthorized access to protected systems, applications, or services. The vulnerability effectively neutralizes the intended security benefits of multi-factor authentication by providing a permanent backdoor that bypasses authentication challenges.
The security implications extend beyond simple unauthorized access to encompass potential privilege escalation and lateral movement within compromised environments. Attackers can leverage these persistent tokens to maintain access over extended periods, making detection more difficult and allowing for prolonged reconnaissance and data exfiltration activities. This vulnerability aligns with CWE-384, which addresses the issue of persistent authentication tokens without proper revocation mechanisms, and represents a clear violation of the principle of least privilege and secure credential management practices.
The operational security impact of this vulnerability is compounded by the lack of user-facing cancellation interfaces that would normally allow users to invalidate compromised tokens. This absence of user control mechanisms forces organizations to rely on administrative processes that may be slow or inconsistent, creating additional security gaps. The attack vector is particularly concerning because it requires minimal technical skill to exploit, making it attractive to attackers ranging from casual threat actors to sophisticated adversaries. This vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of implementing proper token lifecycle management and revocation capabilities as part of comprehensive authentication security strategies.
Organizations affected by this vulnerability should implement immediate mitigations including disabling the problematic SiteKey functionality, implementing additional monitoring for token usage patterns, and establishing manual processes for token revocation where possible. The remediation efforts should focus on implementing proper token lifecycle management, including user-initiated token cancellation interfaces, automatic token expiration mechanisms, and enhanced monitoring for suspicious authentication patterns. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to techniques involving credential access and privilege escalation through the use of stolen authentication tokens, highlighting the need for comprehensive authentication security controls that address both the technical and operational aspects of credential management.