CVE-2007-0219 in Internet Explorer
Summary
by MITRE
Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.01, 6, and 7 uses certain COM objects from (1) Msb1fren.dll, (2) Htmlmm.ocx, and (3) Blnmgrps.dll as ActiveX controls, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, a different issue than CVE-2006-4697.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/05/2025
Microsoft Internet Explorer versions 5.01, 6, and 7 incorporated several ActiveX controls through dynamic link libraries that presented significant security vulnerabilities. These controls originated from Msb1fren.dll, Htmlmm.ocx, and Blnmgrps.dll components that were improperly validated during runtime execution. The vulnerability stemmed from insufficient input sanitization and improper object instantiation within the browser's ActiveX control handling mechanism, creating opportunities for malicious code injection through crafted web content. This flaw represented a distinct threat vector from CVE-2006-4697, indicating separate exploitation paths within the browser's object model architecture.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability exploited the trust model inherent in ActiveX controls where browser components would automatically load and execute registered COM objects without adequate security boundary enforcement. Attackers could leverage this by constructing malicious web pages that would trigger the loading of these vulnerable DLLs through ActiveX instantiation, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the running user. The exploitation mechanism relied on the browser's failure to properly validate the source and integrity of these dynamically loaded components, particularly when they were loaded from untrusted web sources.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extended beyond simple code execution to encompass complete system compromise potential, as attackers could leverage the loaded ActiveX controls to perform actions such as file system manipulation, registry modification, and network communications. The affected versions of Internet Explorer were widely deployed across enterprise environments, making this vulnerability particularly dangerous as it could be exploited through standard web browsing activities without requiring specialized knowledge or tools. Security researchers classified this issue under CWE-16 as a weakness in the design of the ActiveX control loading mechanism, where the system failed to properly establish security boundaries for component execution.
Organizations mitigating this vulnerability had to implement multiple defensive strategies including browser hardening through ActiveX control restrictions, network-level filtering to prevent access to known malicious domains, and user education regarding safe browsing practices. The remediation approach required administrators to either patch the affected browser versions, disable problematic ActiveX controls, or deploy application whitelisting solutions to prevent execution of the vulnerable DLLs. This vulnerability highlighted the broader challenges associated with legacy ActiveX control management and demonstrated how seemingly minor component registration issues could lead to significant security breaches. The attack surface was particularly concerning given that these controls were often loaded automatically during normal browsing operations, making exploitation possible through simple web page visits without user interaction.
The vulnerability's classification aligns with ATT&CK technique T1195 which describes the use of ActiveX controls for malicious code execution, and T1059 which covers the execution of malicious code through scripting or system commands. Organizations needed to implement comprehensive security monitoring to detect anomalous ActiveX control loading patterns and establish proper network segmentation to limit the potential impact of successful exploitation attempts. The remediation process required careful consideration of compatibility issues, as many legitimate applications relied on these same ActiveX controls for functionality, necessitating a balanced approach between security hardening and operational requirements.