CVE-2007-1651 in OpenID
Summary
by MITRE
Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in OpenID allows remote attackers to restore the login session of a user on an OpenID enabled site via unspecified vectors related to an arbitrary remote web site and cached tokens, after the user has signed into an OpenID server, logged into the OpenID enabled site, and then logged out of the OpenID enabled site.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/10/2017
The CVE-2007-1651 vulnerability represents a significant cross-site request forgery flaw within the OpenID authentication framework that fundamentally undermines user session security. This vulnerability operates by exploiting the trust relationship between OpenID servers and relying party websites, creating a scenario where malicious actors can manipulate user sessions through carefully crafted requests. The flaw specifically manifests when users navigate between different websites while maintaining an active OpenID session, allowing attackers to leverage cached authentication tokens and session data from the OpenID server to impersonate legitimate users.
The technical implementation of this CSRF vulnerability stems from insufficient session management and token validation mechanisms within the OpenID protocol implementation. When users authenticate through an OpenID server and subsequently interact with OpenID-enabled websites, the system caches authentication tokens and session information to facilitate seamless user experience. However, this caching mechanism becomes exploitable when attackers craft malicious requests that leverage the cached tokens to restore user sessions on OpenID-enabled sites. The vulnerability's exploitation occurs through unspecified vectors that typically involve embedding malicious code or links on third-party websites that can trigger automatic requests to the OpenID-enabled site, bypassing normal authentication checks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple session hijacking to encompass potential account takeovers, unauthorized transactions, and data compromise across multiple services that rely on OpenID authentication. Attackers can leverage this vulnerability to perform actions on behalf of authenticated users without their knowledge or consent, potentially leading to financial losses, privacy breaches, and unauthorized access to sensitive information. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it can be exploited even after users have explicitly logged out of OpenID-enabled sites, as the cached tokens remain accessible and usable. This persistence of the vulnerability makes it especially challenging to mitigate, as it operates at the protocol level rather than simply being a web application security flaw.
From a cybersecurity perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-352, which specifically addresses cross-site request forgery conditions in web applications. The flaw demonstrates the critical importance of implementing robust anti-CSRF measures within authentication systems, particularly those involving third-party identity providers. Organizations should consider implementing proper token validation, session management, and request origin verification mechanisms to prevent unauthorized session restoration. The ATT&CK framework categorizes this as a privilege escalation technique under the 'Credential Access' domain, where adversaries leverage authentication flaws to maintain persistent access to user accounts. Mitigation strategies should include implementing CSRF tokens for all state-changing operations, enforcing strict session management policies, and ensuring proper logout procedures that invalidate cached authentication data. Additionally, organizations should consider adopting more modern authentication protocols such as OAuth 2.0 or OpenID Connect with proper CSRF protection mechanisms, as these newer standards address many of the session management weaknesses present in the original OpenID implementation.