CVE-2007-5283 in TPBroker Object Transaction Monitor
Summary
by MITRE
The TSC Domain Manager in Hitachi TPBroker Object Transaction Monitor and Cosminexus TPBroker Object Transaction Monitor 01-00 through 03-00 might allow attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via invalid messages.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2017
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2007-5283 affects the TSC Domain Manager component within Hitachi TPBroker Object Transaction Monitor and Cosminexus TPBroker Object Transaction Monitor versions 01-00 through 03-00. This issue represents a classic denial of service vulnerability that specifically targets the transaction monitoring infrastructure of these enterprise systems. The affected systems operate within critical business environments where transaction integrity and system availability are paramount. The vulnerability stems from insufficient input validation mechanisms within the TSC Domain Manager, which processes incoming messages without adequate sanitization or error handling procedures. This weakness creates an exploitable condition where malicious actors can craft and transmit malformed messages designed to trigger system instability.
The technical flaw manifests when the TSC Domain Manager receives invalid messages that exceed expected parameter boundaries or contain malformed data structures. These invalid messages are processed without proper boundary checking or data validation routines, leading to memory corruption or unexpected state transitions within the transaction monitoring process. The vulnerability operates at the application layer and specifically targets the message processing pipeline of the TSC Domain Manager component. According to CWE classification, this represents a weakness categorized under CWE-129 Input Validation and OWASP Top Ten category A03: Injection, though more specifically aligned with CWE-707 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation. The flaw creates a condition where the system's normal operational flow is disrupted through improper handling of unexpected inputs, resulting in system crashes or complete service unavailability.
The operational impact of CVE-2007-5283 extends beyond simple system downtime as it affects the core transaction processing capabilities of enterprise applications relying on these monitoring systems. Organizations utilizing Hitachi TPBroker and Cosminexus TPBroker solutions may experience cascading failures throughout their transaction processing networks, potentially affecting multiple dependent systems and services. The vulnerability's exploitability is relatively straightforward, requiring only the ability to send messages to the affected TSC Domain Manager, making it accessible to both internal and external threat actors. This creates a significant risk for businesses operating in regulated environments where transaction monitoring and system availability are critical compliance requirements. The attack vector aligns with ATT&CK technique T1499.004 Network Denial of Service, specifically targeting application availability through malformed message injection.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on implementing robust input validation mechanisms and establishing proper message sanitization procedures within the TSC Domain Manager. Organizations should deploy network segmentation controls to limit access to the affected components and implement monitoring systems to detect anomalous message patterns. The most effective immediate solution involves applying vendor patches or updates that address the specific input validation weaknesses in the TSC Domain Manager. Additionally, implementing rate limiting and message filtering mechanisms can help reduce the impact of potential exploitation attempts. System administrators should also establish comprehensive logging and alerting procedures to detect when malformed messages are being processed, enabling rapid response to potential attacks. The remediation process should include thorough testing of patched components to ensure that the fix does not introduce regressions in legitimate transaction processing functionality. Organizations should also consider implementing network-based intrusion detection systems to monitor for patterns consistent with exploitation attempts targeting this specific vulnerability.