CVE-2007-5810 in Ucosminexus Developer Standard
Summary
by MITRE
Hitachi Web Server 01-00 through 03-00-01, as used by certain Cosminexus products, does not properly validate SSL client certificates, which might allow remote attackers to spoof authentication via a client certificate with a forged signature.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/03/2017
The vulnerability described in CVE-2007-5810 represents a critical weakness in the SSL/TLS certificate validation mechanism of Hitachi Web Server versions 01-00 through 03-00-01 when deployed within Cosminexus products. This flaw stems from inadequate certificate validation procedures that fail to properly verify the authenticity and integrity of client certificates presented during SSL handshakes. The vulnerability operates at the core of the security infrastructure where trust relationships are established, creating a pathway for malicious actors to bypass authentication mechanisms through certificate forgery. The impact extends beyond simple authentication bypass as it fundamentally undermines the cryptographic security model that SSL/TLS protocols are designed to provide. This weakness specifically affects the certificate validation process where the system accepts client certificates without sufficient verification of their digital signatures, allowing attackers to create forged certificates that appear legitimate to the server. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-295 which addresses improper certificate validation and is consistent with ATT&CK technique T1552.001 related to credentials from password storage modules. The affected Hitachi Web Server implementations do not perform proper certificate chain validation or signature verification, leaving systems exposed to man-in-the-middle attacks where attackers can present fraudulent certificates to gain unauthorized access.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability occurs during the SSL client certificate authentication phase where the server accepts certificates without sufficient cryptographic verification. When a client presents a certificate to the Hitachi Web Server, the system should validate the certificate's digital signature against the issuing certificate authority's public key to ensure the certificate's authenticity. However, the vulnerable implementation fails to perform this crucial validation step, allowing forged certificates to be accepted as legitimate. The flaw manifests in the certificate validation logic where signature verification routines are either absent or improperly implemented, creating a security gap that attackers can exploit. This weakness specifically impacts the certificate verification process during the SSL handshake, where the server should reject certificates that fail signature validation. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it allows remote attackers to establish authenticated sessions without possessing legitimate credentials, effectively enabling unauthorized access to protected resources. The lack of proper certificate validation creates a trust relationship that can be easily manipulated, undermining the entire purpose of using SSL/TLS for secure communication and authentication.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple authentication bypass, as it creates persistent security risks for organizations using affected Cosminexus products. Systems relying on this vulnerable web server configuration become susceptible to unauthorized access, data breaches, and privilege escalation attacks. Attackers can exploit this weakness to impersonate legitimate users or systems, potentially gaining access to sensitive information, modifying data, or performing administrative functions. The vulnerability affects the fundamental security posture of deployed systems, as it allows attackers to establish trust relationships that should never be granted without proper authentication. Organizations may experience unauthorized access to critical systems, compromise of sensitive data, and potential regulatory violations depending on the nature of the protected information. The long-term implications include the possibility of persistent access where attackers can maintain control over compromised systems for extended periods. The vulnerability also impacts the integrity of the authentication infrastructure, potentially affecting other security controls that depend on proper certificate validation for their effectiveness. This weakness can compound other security issues, as attackers who gain access through this vulnerability may then attempt to escalate privileges or move laterally within the network.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2007-5810 should focus on immediate remediation through software updates and configuration changes. Organizations must upgrade to patched versions of Hitachi Web Server that properly implement certificate validation procedures and cryptographic signature verification. The recommended approach includes applying official security patches from Hitachi, which should address the certificate validation logic and restore proper signature verification mechanisms. Additionally, administrators should implement enhanced monitoring of SSL handshakes and certificate validation failures to detect potential exploitation attempts. Network segmentation and additional authentication layers should be considered as temporary compensating controls while full patch deployment occurs. Security configurations should be reviewed to ensure that certificate validation is properly enforced and that weak cryptographic parameters are not accepted. The implementation of certificate pinning mechanisms and additional certificate validation checks can provide enhanced protection against similar vulnerabilities. Organizations should also conduct thorough vulnerability assessments to identify all instances of the affected software and ensure complete remediation across their infrastructure. Regular security audits and continuous monitoring of authentication processes are essential to prevent exploitation of this and related vulnerabilities. The remediation process should include verification that the updated systems properly validate certificate signatures and reject forged certificates through proper cryptographic verification procedures.