CVE-2007-6210 in Zabbix
Summary
by MITRE
zabbix_agentd 1.1.4 in ZABBIX before 1.4.3 runs "UserParameter" scripts with gid 0, which might allow local users to gain privileges.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/05/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2007-6210 affects zabbix_agentd version 1.1.4 in ZABBIX before 1.4.3, presenting a critical privilege escalation risk through improper execution context handling. This flaw occurs when UserParameter scripts are executed with group identifier (gid) set to 0, which corresponds to the root group privileges in Unix-like operating systems. The vulnerability stems from the agent's failure to properly drop group privileges before executing user-defined scripts, creating an exploitable condition where local attackers can leverage this misconfiguration to gain elevated system access.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involves the zabbix_agentd daemon executing UserParameter scripts with elevated group permissions. When a UserParameter is defined in the agent configuration, it typically specifies a command to be executed and returned to the ZABBIX server for monitoring purposes. However, in affected versions, the daemon does not properly sanitize the execution environment before running these scripts, maintaining the root group context. This behavior directly violates the principle of least privilege and creates a path for privilege escalation attacks. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-276 as "Incorrect Default Permissions" and specifically relates to improper privilege management during process execution. Attackers can exploit this by crafting UserParameter definitions that execute malicious code with root group privileges, potentially allowing them to modify system files, install backdoors, or escalate to full root access.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation, as it can enable attackers to compromise entire monitoring infrastructures that rely on ZABBIX agent deployments. Since zabbix_agentd typically runs with elevated privileges to perform system monitoring tasks, the vulnerability creates a persistent backdoor that can be exploited even after initial access is gained. The attack surface is particularly concerning in enterprise environments where ZABBIX is used for critical infrastructure monitoring, as compromised agents can provide attackers with continuous access to monitored systems. This vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1068 which covers "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation" and can be leveraged as part of broader attack chains involving system reconnaissance and lateral movement. The impact is amplified because the ZABBIX monitoring infrastructure often has access to sensitive system information and may be deployed across multiple network segments, making the compromised agent a valuable foothold for further attacks.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate patching to ZABBIX versions 1.4.3 and later, which properly handle group privilege dropping during script execution. System administrators should also implement strict access controls on ZABBIX configuration files and UserParameter definitions to prevent unauthorized modifications. The recommended approach includes configuring the zabbix_agentd daemon to run with minimal required privileges, implementing proper file permissions for configuration files, and monitoring for unauthorized changes to UserParameter definitions. Additionally, organizations should conduct thorough security audits of their monitoring infrastructure to identify any other potential privilege escalation vectors and ensure that all monitoring agents are running patched versions. The vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of privilege separation in monitoring systems and highlights the need for comprehensive security testing of agent-based monitoring solutions to prevent similar issues in the future.