CVE-2008-1447 in Access Gateway
Summary
by MITRE
The DNS protocol, as implemented in (1) BIND 8 and 9 before 9.5.0-P1, 9.4.2-P1, and 9.3.5-P1; (2) Microsoft DNS in Windows 2000 SP4, XP SP2 and SP3, and Server 2003 SP1 and SP2; and other implementations allow remote attackers to spoof DNS traffic via a birthday attack that uses in-bailiwick referrals to conduct cache poisoning against recursive resolvers, related to insufficient randomness of DNS transaction IDs and source ports, aka "DNS Insufficient Socket Entropy Vulnerability" or "the Kaminsky bug."
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/05/2025
The DNS Insufficient Socket Entropy Vulnerability represents one of the most significant security flaws in internet infrastructure, fundamentally compromising the trustworthiness of domain name resolution systems. This vulnerability affects multiple DNS implementations including BIND versions prior to 9.5.0-P1, 9.4.2-P1, and 9.3.5-P1, as well as Microsoft DNS implementations on various Windows operating systems. The flaw stems from inadequate randomness in DNS transaction identifiers and source port selection, creating predictable patterns that malicious actors can exploit through sophisticated attack techniques.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability relies on a birthday attack methodology that leverages in-bailiwick referrals to manipulate DNS cache poisoning attempts. Attackers can predict the transaction IDs and source ports used by recursive DNS resolvers, allowing them to inject false DNS responses into the cache before legitimate responses arrive. This enables attackers to redirect users to malicious websites by poisoning the DNS cache with forged A records, effectively performing man-in-the-middle attacks against DNS resolution processes. The vulnerability operates at the core of DNS protocol implementation, exploiting the fundamental assumption that transaction identifiers and source ports should be sufficiently random to prevent such attacks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond individual system compromises, potentially affecting entire DNS infrastructures and undermining the integrity of internet communications. When successful, cache poisoning attacks can redirect traffic to malicious servers, enabling phishing campaigns, data interception, and service disruption attacks. The vulnerability's widespread presence across multiple DNS implementations means that organizations with diverse operating environments face significant exposure, as attackers can target the weakest link in their DNS infrastructure regardless of the specific implementation used. This creates cascading security risks that can propagate through interconnected networks and affect numerous downstream systems.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate implementation of security patches and configuration updates across all affected DNS implementations. Organizations should prioritize upgrading to patched versions of BIND, Windows DNS servers, and other affected DNS software implementations. Additional protective measures include implementing DNSSEC to provide cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, configuring proper source port randomization, and establishing monitoring systems to detect anomalous DNS traffic patterns. Network administrators should also consider implementing rate limiting and query validation mechanisms to reduce the effectiveness of cache poisoning attempts. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-330, which addresses insufficient entropy in random number generation, and represents a classic example of how weak entropy sources can enable sophisticated network attacks. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to techniques involving DNS tunneling and cache poisoning, demonstrating how fundamental protocol flaws can be exploited to achieve persistent network infiltration and data manipulation capabilities.