CVE-2008-1865 in openmosix
Summary
by MITRE
Stack-based buffer overflow in the msx_readnode function in libmosix.c in openmosix-tools (aka userspace-tools) in openMosix might allow local users to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a third-party program that calls this function with a long item argument. NOTE: the vendor does not provide any program that is capable of causing this overflow.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/17/2019
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2008-1865 represents a stack-based buffer overflow flaw within the openMosix userspace-tools component, specifically within the msx_readnode function located in libmosix.c. This issue affects the openMosix distributed computing framework that enables resource sharing across multiple machines. The vulnerability manifests when the msx_readnode function processes a third-party program that invokes it with an excessively long item argument, creating conditions where memory corruption can occur. The flaw resides in the improper handling of input data length, where the function fails to validate or limit the size of the item parameter before processing it on the stack. Such buffer overflow conditions are particularly dangerous because they can lead to unpredictable application behavior and potential system instability. The vulnerability is classified as a stack-based buffer overflow, which is a well-known class of memory corruption vulnerabilities that fall under CWE-121, indicating weakness in the stack buffer management. According to ATT&CK framework, this vulnerability could be leveraged as part of a local privilege escalation technique or denial of service attack vector through code execution or application crash.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability demonstrates how insufficient input validation in system-level libraries can create dangerous conditions for system stability. The msx_readnode function in libmosix.c does not perform adequate bounds checking on the item argument parameter, allowing an attacker to overflow the allocated stack buffer space. When a malicious third-party program calls this function with an oversized argument, the excess data overflows into adjacent stack memory locations, potentially corrupting return addresses, function pointers, or other critical program state information. This overflow condition directly leads to application crash or denial of service, as the program loses control flow integrity. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it operates at the userspace level within the openMosix framework, meaning that local users could potentially exploit this flaw to disrupt distributed computing operations. The absence of an official program capable of triggering this overflow does not diminish its severity, as the vulnerability exists in the underlying library and can be exploited through any third-party application that properly invokes the affected function.
The operational impact of CVE-2008-1865 extends beyond simple denial of service to potentially compromise the stability of distributed computing environments that rely on openMosix for resource sharing and load balancing. When the msx_readnode function crashes due to buffer overflow, it can cause cascading failures within the distributed system, affecting multiple nodes that depend on the openMosix framework for coordination and resource management. This vulnerability creates a persistent threat to system availability, particularly in environments where distributed computing workloads are critical for business operations. The local privilege escalation potential exists because attackers with access to the system can craft malicious programs that exploit this vulnerability to gain control over the openMosix processes. From a security perspective, this vulnerability represents a classic example of how insufficient input validation in system libraries can create widespread impact, as the affected code path is likely used by multiple components within the openMosix ecosystem. The vulnerability's impact is amplified by its potential to be chained with other exploits that could lead to privilege escalation or information disclosure within the distributed computing environment.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2008-1865 should focus on input validation and bounds checking within the affected library. The most effective approach involves implementing proper parameter length validation in the msx_readnode function to ensure that item arguments do not exceed predefined safe limits before processing. System administrators should immediately apply patches or updates from the openMosix maintainers that address this specific buffer overflow condition. Additionally, implementing runtime protections such as stack canaries, address space layout randomization, and non-executable stack protections can provide defense-in-depth measures against exploitation attempts. Regular monitoring and auditing of system logs should be implemented to detect any suspicious activity that might indicate exploitation attempts. Security teams should also consider implementing application whitelisting policies that restrict execution of third-party programs that might invoke the vulnerable function. The vulnerability highlights the importance of secure coding practices and input validation in system-level libraries, particularly those that operate within distributed computing frameworks where reliability and stability are paramount for maintaining system integrity and preventing cascading failures across networked environments.