CVE-2008-2002 in Surfboard
Summary
by MITRE
Multiple cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities on Motorola Surfboard with software SB5100-2.3.3.0-SCM00-NOSH allow remote attackers to (1) cause a denial of service (device reboot) via the "Restart Cable Modem" value in the BUTTON_INPUT parameter to configdata.html, and (2) cause a denial of service (hard reset) via the "Reset All Defaults" value in the BUTTON_INPUT parameter to configdata.html.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/23/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2008-2002 affects Motorola Surfboard cable modems running firmware version SB5100-2.3.3.0-SCM00-NOSH, representing a critical security flaw in network infrastructure devices that enables unauthorized remote attackers to execute malicious actions through cross-site request forgery techniques. This vulnerability resides within the web-based administration interface of the device, specifically targeting the configdata.html page which handles configuration parameters and device control functions.
The technical implementation of this CSRF vulnerability stems from the absence of proper authentication mechanisms and anti-CSRF tokens within the device's web interface. When an attacker crafts malicious requests containing the BUTTON_INPUT parameter with values "Restart Cable Modem" or "Reset All Defaults", the device processes these requests without verifying the authenticity of the source or requiring proper authorization. This design flaw allows attackers to manipulate device behavior by exploiting the trust relationship between the web browser and the device's administration interface, where the device automatically executes commands based on the parameters provided in the HTTP request without proper validation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability manifests as two distinct denial of service conditions that can severely disrupt network connectivity and device functionality. The first variant causes a device reboot through the "Restart Cable Modem" command, which temporarily interrupts network services and requires manual intervention to restore connectivity. The second variant executes a hard reset via the "Reset All Defaults" command, which not only causes a device reboot but also erases all user configurations and returns the device to factory settings, potentially requiring complete reconfiguration and network reestablishment. Both scenarios represent significant operational risks for network administrators who rely on consistent device availability and configuration integrity.
From a cybersecurity perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-352, which specifically addresses Cross-Site Request Forgery weaknesses in web applications. The attack vector follows the typical pattern described in MITRE's ATT&CK framework under T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application, where adversaries target web interfaces of network devices to execute unauthorized commands. The vulnerability represents a fundamental flaw in the device's authentication model, where the web interface lacks proper session management and request validation mechanisms. Network security professionals should recognize that this vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it operates at the network infrastructure level, potentially allowing attackers to disrupt services for multiple users connected through the same cable modem.
The recommended mitigations for this vulnerability involve implementing proper authentication mechanisms and anti-CSRF token validation within the device's web interface. Device manufacturers should ensure that all administrative functions require proper authentication tokens that are tied to specific user sessions and validated on each request. Network administrators should consider implementing network segmentation and access controls to limit exposure of these devices to untrusted networks. Additionally, regular firmware updates and security assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate similar vulnerabilities in network infrastructure devices. The vulnerability also highlights the importance of security-by-design principles in embedded network devices, where authentication and authorization mechanisms must be implemented at the architectural level rather than as afterthoughts.