CVE-2008-3010 in Windows Media Player
Summary
by MITRE
Microsoft Windows Media Player 6.4, Windows Media Format Runtime 7.1 through 11, and Windows Media Services 4.1 and 9 incorrectly associate ISATAP addresses with the Local Intranet zone, which allows remote servers to capture NTLM credentials, and execute arbitrary code through credential-reflection attacks, by sending an authentication request, aka "ISATAP Vulnerability."
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/26/2025
The CVE-2008-3010 vulnerability represents a significant security flaw in Microsoft Windows operating systems and media frameworks that exploited the improper handling of ISATAP (Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol) addresses within the Windows security zone model. This vulnerability specifically affected Windows Media Player 6.4, Windows Media Format Runtime versions 7.1 through 11, and Windows Media Services 4.1 and 9, creating a critical pathway for credential theft and remote code execution attacks. The flaw emerged from the incorrect association of ISATAP addresses with the Local Intranet security zone, which fundamentally altered how Windows handled network authentication and credential management for these specific network protocols.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stemmed from the Windows security zone classification system where ISATAP addresses were being automatically assigned to the Local Intranet zone rather than being properly isolated in the Internet zone. This misclassification occurred because ISATAP addresses, which are typically used for IPv6 tunneling within local networks, were being treated as trusted internal network resources. When remote servers could establish connections using ISATAP addresses, they could exploit this trust relationship to initiate credential-reflection attacks, essentially tricking Windows into performing authentication requests that would reveal NTLM credentials. The vulnerability exploited the Windows authentication mechanism where the system would automatically attempt to authenticate against ISATAP addresses that were incorrectly classified as local resources.
The operational impact of this vulnerability was severe and multifaceted, as it enabled attackers to perform credential capture attacks that could lead to complete system compromise. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability by simply sending authentication requests to systems running the affected software, triggering credential-reflection mechanisms that would capture NTLM hashes. These captured credentials could then be used for lateral movement within networks or for privilege escalation attacks, particularly in environments where Windows authentication was heavily relied upon. The vulnerability also enabled arbitrary code execution, as successful credential capture often provided attackers with sufficient access to deploy malicious payloads or establish persistent backdoors.
The exploitation of this vulnerability aligns with several ATT&CK techniques including credential harvesting through authentication protocol manipulation, privilege escalation via credential reuse, and lateral movement through network reconnaissance. From a CWE perspective, this vulnerability maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, as it involved incorrect security zone classification that allowed unauthorized access to authentication mechanisms. The vulnerability also relates to CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information, as NTLM credentials were being exposed through the authentication reflection process. Organizations affected by this vulnerability faced significant risk of data breaches, system compromise, and unauthorized access to internal network resources, particularly in environments where Windows Media services were actively used and where ISATAP was enabled on network infrastructure.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2008-3010 focused on addressing the root cause through proper security zone configuration and network segmentation. Microsoft released security updates that corrected the ISATAP address handling within the Windows security model, ensuring that ISATAP addresses were properly classified in the Internet zone rather than the Local Intranet zone. Organizations should have implemented network segmentation to isolate media services from critical internal systems, disabled unnecessary ISATAP functionality on network devices, and deployed network monitoring solutions to detect anomalous authentication patterns. Additionally, implementing strong credential policies including the use of Kerberos authentication instead of NTLM, disabling SMBv1 protocols, and enforcing strong password policies helped reduce the attack surface and mitigate potential exploitation of this vulnerability.