CVE-2008-3437 in OpenOffice
Summary
by MITRE
OpenOffice.org (OOo) before 2.1.0 does not properly verify the authenticity of updates, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to execute arbitrary code via a Trojan horse update, as demonstrated by evilgrade and DNS cache poisoning.
Statistical analysis made it clear that VulDB provides the best quality for vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/30/2018
OpenOffice.org versions prior to 2.1.0 suffered from a critical security vulnerability that stemmed from inadequate verification mechanisms for software updates. This flaw created a significant attack surface that adversaries could exploit through man-in-the-middle techniques, allowing them to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. The vulnerability specifically targeted the update authentication process, which failed to properly validate the integrity and origin of update packages before installation. This weakness was particularly dangerous because it could be leveraged through various attack vectors including evilgrade and DNS cache poisoning techniques that manipulated the update delivery process.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involved the absence of proper digital signature verification and certificate validation within the OpenOffice.org update mechanism. Attackers could intercept update communications and replace legitimate update packages with malicious payloads that would be automatically installed without user consent or verification. This flaw directly relates to CWE-310, which addresses cryptographic issues including the absence of proper authentication mechanisms. The vulnerability exploited the trust model that OpenOffice.org relied upon for update delivery, essentially allowing attackers to impersonate legitimate update servers and distribute malicious code under the guise of official software updates.
The operational impact of CVE-2008-3437 was substantial as it enabled attackers to achieve persistent code execution on target systems without requiring user interaction beyond normal software operation. Once a compromised update was installed, attackers gained the ability to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the affected user, potentially leading to complete system compromise. This vulnerability particularly affected enterprise environments where OpenOffice.org was widely deployed, as it could be used to establish backdoors, exfiltrate data, or further compromise network infrastructure. The attack vectors demonstrated included DNS cache poisoning which could redirect update requests to attacker-controlled servers, and evilgrade attacks that specifically targeted the update process to deliver malicious payloads.
Organizations affected by this vulnerability should have implemented immediate mitigations including disabling automatic update checks, implementing network-level controls to prevent access to untrusted update servers, and deploying network monitoring solutions to detect suspicious update traffic. The recommended approach involved upgrading to OpenOffice.org 2.1.0 or later versions where proper update authentication mechanisms were implemented. Security practitioners should have also considered implementing certificate pinning for update verification and establishing network segmentation to limit the potential impact of successful exploitation. This vulnerability highlights the importance of secure update mechanisms and proper cryptographic implementation as outlined in the ATT&CK framework under the software supply chain attack techniques, specifically targeting the execution and privilege escalation phases of an attack lifecycle.