CVE-2009-0582 in evolution-data-server
Summary
by MITRE
The ntlm_challenge function in the NTLM SASL authentication mechanism in camel/camel-sasl-ntlm.c in Camel in Evolution Data Server (aka evolution-data-server) 2.24.5 and earlier, and 2.25.92 and earlier 2.25.x versions, does not validate whether a certain length value is consistent with the amount of data in a challenge packet, which allows remote mail servers to read information from the process memory of a client, or cause a denial of service (client crash), via an NTLM authentication type 2 packet with a length value that exceeds the amount of packet data.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/31/2019
The vulnerability described in CVE-2009-0582 represents a critical memory corruption issue within the NTLM SASL authentication mechanism implemented in Evolution Data Server's Camel component. This flaw exists in the ntlm_challenge function which processes NTLM authentication type 2 packets during SASL authentication flows. The vulnerability stems from insufficient input validation where the system fails to verify that length fields in the challenge packet correspond to the actual amount of data present in the packet. This inconsistency creates a scenario where remote malicious servers can manipulate the authentication process by crafting specially crafted NTLM type 2 packets with malformed length values that exceed the actual packet data size.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability falls under CWE-129, which describes improper validation of length fields, and more specifically aligns with CWE-125, indicating improper validation of buffer access. The flaw operates at the protocol parsing layer where the NTLM authentication mechanism does not perform adequate bounds checking on packet structures before attempting to process or copy data from the challenge packet. When a client receives an NTLM type 2 packet with an inconsistent length field, the parsing logic attempts to access memory locations beyond the actual packet boundaries, leading to information disclosure or denial of service conditions.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple authentication failures, creating potential security risks for email clients using Evolution Data Server. Remote attackers can exploit this weakness to perform memory disclosure attacks, potentially extracting sensitive information from the client process memory including authentication tokens, user credentials, or other confidential data. Additionally, the vulnerability can be leveraged for denial of service attacks, causing client applications to crash and potentially rendering email services unavailable to legitimate users. The attack vector requires only that an attacker control a mail server that can be reached by the vulnerable client, making it particularly dangerous in environments where users connect to untrusted mail servers.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2009-0582 should focus on implementing proper input validation and bounds checking within the NTLM authentication parsing logic. The most effective remediation involves updating to patched versions of Evolution Data Server where the ntlm_challenge function has been modified to validate that length fields in challenge packets are consistent with actual data sizes before processing. Organizations should also implement network segmentation and access controls to limit exposure to potentially malicious mail servers. From an ATT&CK perspective, this vulnerability maps to techniques involving privilege escalation through protocol manipulation and information gathering through memory disclosure attacks. The vulnerability demonstrates how seemingly minor input validation flaws can create significant security implications in authentication mechanisms, highlighting the importance of robust validation practices in security-critical code components. System administrators should prioritize patching affected systems and monitor for potential exploitation attempts in their network traffic logs.