CVE-2009-1721 in OpenEXR
Summary
by MITRE
The decompression implementation in the Imf::hufUncompress function in OpenEXR 1.2.2 and 1.6.1 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via vectors that trigger a free of an uninitialized pointer.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/15/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2009-1721 resides within the OpenEXR image processing library version 1.2.2 and 1.6.1, specifically within the Imf::hufUncompress function responsible for decompressing image data. This flaw represents a critical security issue that can be exploited through context-dependent attack vectors, potentially leading to either denial of service conditions or arbitrary code execution on affected systems. The vulnerability stems from improper handling of memory operations during the decompression process, creating a scenario where an attacker can manipulate input data to trigger unintended behavior in the application's memory management subsystem.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper initialization of pointers within the decompression algorithm, specifically when the Imf::hufUncompress function processes compressed image data. When malformed or specially crafted input data is provided to the decompression routine, the function attempts to free memory locations that have not been properly initialized, resulting in undefined behavior. This uninitialized pointer dereference creates a condition where the application may attempt to access invalid memory addresses or execute code from unexpected memory locations, fundamentally compromising the application's stability and security posture. The vulnerability classifies under CWE-476 as an attempt to dereference a null pointer, though the specific manifestation involves uninitialized pointer usage during memory deallocation operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple denial of service scenarios, as it can potentially enable remote code execution in certain conditions. Attackers can exploit this weakness by crafting malicious OpenEXR image files that, when processed by vulnerable applications, trigger the faulty decompression logic. This creates a significant risk for applications that handle user-supplied image data, including content management systems, digital asset management platforms, and image processing pipelines. The vulnerability affects any software that relies on OpenEXR 1.2.2 or 1.6.1 libraries for image decompression, making it particularly dangerous in environments where untrusted image data is processed automatically. The attack surface is further expanded due to the widespread adoption of OpenEXR in professional imaging workflows, including film production, visual effects, and digital art applications.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate remediation through version updates, as the issue has been resolved in subsequent releases of the OpenEXR library. Organizations should prioritize upgrading to OpenEXR versions 1.7.0 or later, which contain proper pointer initialization and memory management controls within the decompression routines. Additionally, input validation measures should be implemented at application boundaries to filter or reject potentially malicious image files before they reach the vulnerable decompression functions. Security controls should include sandboxing mechanisms and strict file format validation to prevent exploitation attempts. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to the T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution technique, as it enables attackers to execute arbitrary code through compromised applications. Network-based defenses should include content filtering and file type validation to prevent malicious image files from entering the processing pipeline, while host-based solutions should focus on monitoring for unusual memory access patterns and implementing proper memory protection mechanisms.