CVE-2010-0479 in Publisher
Summary
by MITRE
Buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Publisher 2002 SP3, 2003 SP3, and 2007 SP1 and SP2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Publisher file, aka "Microsoft Office Publisher File Conversion TextBox Processing Buffer Overflow Vulnerability."
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/01/2025
This vulnerability represents a critical buffer overflow flaw in Microsoft Office Publisher versions 2002 SP3, 2003 SP3, and 2007 SP1 and SP2 that enables remote code execution through maliciously crafted Publisher files. The vulnerability specifically occurs during the processing of TextBox elements within Publisher file conversion operations, making it particularly dangerous as it can be triggered when users open or preview infected documents. The flaw stems from inadequate bounds checking during the handling of structured data within Publisher's file format parser, allowing attackers to overwrite adjacent memory locations with malicious code payloads. This vulnerability aligns with CWE-121, which describes stack-based buffer overflow conditions, and represents a classic example of unsafe memory manipulation that has been historically prevalent in Microsoft Office applications. The attack vector is particularly concerning as it requires no user interaction beyond opening a malicious file, making it suitable for drive-by download attacks and social engineering campaigns where users might inadvertently encounter compromised Publisher documents.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involves the manipulation of Publisher's internal file parsing mechanisms when processing TextBox elements that contain oversized or malformed data structures. During normal operation, Publisher expects certain data formats and sizes for its internal objects, but the buffer overflow occurs when attackers craft Publisher files containing specially designed TextBox content that exceeds allocated memory buffers. The overflow typically occurs in the application's memory management routines where it processes document elements, potentially overwriting return addresses, function pointers, or other critical execution context data. This type of vulnerability falls under the ATT&CK technique T1059.005 for command and script interpreter, as successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the affected user. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because Publisher is often used in business environments where users may open documents received via email or shared networks, making it an attractive target for targeted attacks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple remote code execution to encompass significant security implications for enterprise environments that rely on Microsoft Office Publisher for document creation and sharing. Organizations using affected Publisher versions face potential compromise of entire networks through successful exploitation, as attackers could leverage this vulnerability to establish persistent backdoors, escalate privileges, or deploy additional malware. The vulnerability's remote exploit capability means that attackers need not have physical access to target systems, allowing for widespread exploitation through phishing campaigns, compromised websites, or malicious file sharing platforms. This makes it particularly dangerous for organizations that do not maintain up-to-date patch management procedures or that continue to use legacy software versions. The vulnerability also demonstrates the persistent nature of memory corruption flaws in Microsoft Office applications, as similar issues have been identified in other Office products, highlighting the need for comprehensive security testing and validation of document processing components. Organizations should consider implementing network segmentation and application whitelisting as additional defensive measures to limit the potential impact of successful exploitation attempts.
Microsoft addressed this vulnerability through security updates released as part of their regular patch cycle, requiring users to apply the appropriate service packs and security updates to mitigate the risk. The patch typically involves enhanced bounds checking and memory validation routines within Publisher's file processing code, preventing the overflow conditions that previously allowed arbitrary code execution. Organizations should prioritize patch deployment and consider implementing automated patch management solutions to ensure all affected systems receive updates promptly. Additionally, security awareness training for users to recognize potentially malicious documents and email attachments remains crucial in defending against exploitation attempts that rely on social engineering tactics to deliver compromised Publisher files to target systems.