CVE-2010-0487 in Windows
Summary
by MITRE
The Authenticode Signature verification functionality in cabview.dll in Cabinet File Viewer Shell Extension 5.1, 6.0, and 6.1 in Microsoft Windows 2000 SP4, Windows XP SP2 and SP3, Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista Gold, SP1, and SP2, Windows Server 2008 Gold, SP2, and R2, and Windows 7 does not properly use unspecified fields in a file digest, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a modified cabinet (aka .CAB) file that incorrectly appears to have a valid signature, aka "Cabview Corruption Validation Vulnerability."
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/08/2021
The Cabview Corruption Validation Vulnerability represents a critical security flaw in Microsoft's Cabinet File Viewer Shell Extension that affects multiple Windows operating systems from Windows 2000 through Windows 7. This vulnerability specifically targets the Authenticode signature verification mechanism within cabview.dll, which is responsible for validating the authenticity and integrity of cabinet files. The flaw stems from improper handling of unspecified fields within file digests during signature validation, creating a pathway for malicious actors to bypass security checks. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it allows remote code execution through the manipulation of cabinet files that appear legitimate but contain malicious content. This issue demonstrates a fundamental failure in the cryptographic validation process where the system accepts modified files as valid due to the insufficient verification of digest fields.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability lies in the manner in which the Cabinet File Viewer processes and validates file signatures. When a cabinet file is opened, the system should verify that the file's contents match the expected digest values contained within the signature. However, the flaw in cabview.dll causes the system to ignore or inadequately process certain unspecified fields within the file digest structure. This incomplete validation allows attackers to modify cabinet files while maintaining the appearance of a valid signature, effectively circumventing the intended security controls. The vulnerability operates at the shell extension level, meaning it can be triggered simply by opening a malicious cabinet file through the Windows Explorer interface, making exploitation particularly easy and widespread across affected systems. This type of flaw falls under the category of cryptographic weakness where the implementation does not properly enforce security checks, creating a path for privilege escalation and arbitrary code execution.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple code execution, as it represents a complete breakdown in the signature verification mechanism that is fundamental to Windows security architecture. Attackers can craft malicious cabinet files that appear to be signed by trusted entities, exploiting the trust model that users and systems place in digitally signed content. This vulnerability affects all versions of Windows from the older Windows 2000 through Windows 7, creating a massive attack surface that spans nearly two decades of Microsoft operating systems. The exploitation requires no special privileges beyond the ability to place a malicious file on the target system, making it particularly dangerous in enterprise environments where users may open untrusted files from network shares or email attachments. The vulnerability essentially allows attackers to perform a form of code injection through legitimate-looking files, undermining the security assurances that digital signatures are meant to provide. This issue aligns with ATT&CK technique T1059 which covers command and script interpreter, as the successful exploitation would enable attackers to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user opening the file.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. Microsoft addressed this issue through security updates that corrected the signature verification logic in cabview.dll, requiring users to apply the appropriate patches for their operating systems. Organizations should implement strict file access controls and disable unnecessary shell extensions to reduce the attack surface, particularly in environments where users may encounter untrusted cabinet files. The vulnerability highlights the importance of proper cryptographic implementation and validation, as defined by industry standards such as those outlined in the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) catalog. Security professionals should also consider implementing application whitelisting policies to prevent the execution of unsigned or improperly validated cabinet files, and regular security assessments should verify that shell extensions are properly configured and updated. Additionally, network-based security controls such as content filtering and sandboxing can provide additional layers of protection against exploitation attempts. The vulnerability serves as a reminder of the critical importance of proper cryptographic validation and the potential consequences when these security mechanisms fail to properly implement their intended security properties.