CVE-2010-0716 in SharePoint Server
Summary
by MITRE
_layouts/Upload.aspx in the Documents module in Microsoft SharePoint before 2010 uses URLs with the same hostname and port number for a web site's primary files and individual users' uploaded files (aka attachments), which allows remote authenticated users to leverage same-origin relationships and conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by uploading TXT files, a related issue to CVE-2008-5026. NOTE: the vendor disputes the significance of this issue, because cross-domain isolation can be implemented when needed.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/01/2026
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-0716 resides within Microsoft SharePoint's Documents module, specifically in the _layouts/Upload.aspx page responsible for file uploads. This issue represents a classic cross-site scripting vulnerability that exploits the same-origin policy by leveraging predictable URL structures where both primary website files and user-uploaded attachments share identical hostname and port configurations. The flaw enables authenticated attackers to upload malicious text files that can subsequently be executed within the context of the victim's browser session, creating a persistent XSS vector that operates through the legitimate upload mechanism.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from SharePoint's handling of file upload paths where the system does not properly isolate the origins of uploaded content from the main application domain. When users upload files through the Documents module, the system assigns URLs that maintain the same hostname and port number structure as the primary website, violating the fundamental principle of web security that different content sources should be properly isolated. This design flaw creates an environment where uploaded files can be accessed through the same security context as the primary site, allowing attackers to craft malicious content that executes within the victim's browser session with the privileges of the authenticated user.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability poses significant risks to SharePoint environments as it allows attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the context of authenticated users. The attack requires only legitimate upload permissions, making it particularly dangerous in environments where users have access to document management features. The impact extends beyond simple XSS execution as attackers can potentially harvest session cookies, redirect users to malicious sites, or perform actions on behalf of authenticated users within the SharePoint environment. The vulnerability's persistence is enhanced by the fact that uploaded files remain accessible through predictable URL patterns, creating ongoing attack vectors that can be exploited repeatedly.
The security implications of CVE-2010-0716 align with CWE-79 which specifically addresses cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, and the attack vector demonstrates characteristics consistent with ATT&CK technique T1566.001 for initial access through malicious file uploads. The vendor's response dismissing the issue highlights a fundamental misunderstanding of web security principles, as the same-origin policy violation creates inherent risks regardless of additional security measures. While organizations may implement cross-domain isolation measures, the vulnerability exists at the application layer and cannot be fully mitigated through network-level controls alone. Organizations should implement proper input validation, file type restrictions, and content sanitization mechanisms to prevent exploitation, while also considering the broader security architecture implications of shared origin configurations in web applications.
The vulnerability's relationship to CVE-2008-5026 demonstrates a recurring pattern in SharePoint security where similar origin-related issues continue to surface in different modules, indicating systemic design flaws in how the platform handles file upload and URL generation processes. This pattern suggests that organizations should conduct comprehensive security assessments of their SharePoint environments to identify similar vulnerabilities in other modules that might leverage the same underlying architectural assumptions about URL handling and origin isolation. The persistence of such issues across multiple versions of SharePoint underscores the importance of maintaining up-to-date security patches and implementing defensive measures beyond vendor-provided solutions to protect against these fundamental web security weaknesses.