CVE-2010-2363 in SEIL-X1
Summary
by MITRE
The IPv6 Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) implementation on the SEIL/X1, SEIL/X2, and SEIL/B1 routers with firmware 1.00 through 2.73, when strict mode is used, does not properly drop packets, which might allow remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a spoofed IP address.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/06/2018
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-2363 represents a critical flaw in the IPv6 unicast reverse path forwarding implementation on specific SEIL/X1, SEIL/X2, and SEIL/B1 router models. This issue manifests when the routers operate in strict RPF mode, which is designed to validate the source address of incoming packets against the routing table to prevent IP address spoofing. The flaw occurs because the implementation fails to properly drop packets that fail the RPF check, creating a security loophole that allows malicious actors to bypass intended access controls through spoofed IP addresses. The vulnerability affects firmware versions ranging from 1.00 through 2.73, indicating a significant window of affected products that would have been deployed across various network infrastructures. This represents a fundamental breakdown in the router's packet filtering capabilities, as RPF is a critical security mechanism designed to prevent unauthorized network access by ensuring that packets arrive on the interface that would be used to send packets back to their source address.
The technical nature of this vulnerability stems from improper packet validation logic within the router's IPv6 processing pipeline. When strict RPF mode is enabled, the router should verify that the incoming packet's source address can be reached through the same interface on which the packet was received, effectively preventing spoofed packets from traversing the network. However, the flawed implementation fails to properly execute this validation process, allowing packets that should be dropped to continue through the network stack. This creates a pathway for remote attackers to exploit the network by crafting packets with spoofed source addresses that appear to originate from trusted network segments. The vulnerability specifically affects the IPv6 implementation, which is increasingly important as organizations transition from IPv4 to IPv6 addressing schemes, making this a particularly concerning issue given the growing adoption of IPv6 networks. From a cybersecurity perspective, this flaw aligns with CWE-284, which describes improper access control, and represents a classic case of insufficient validation of network packet source addresses.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple network security concerns, as it fundamentally undermines the trust model that network administrators rely upon for securing their infrastructure. Attackers could leverage this weakness to conduct various malicious activities including network reconnaissance, unauthorized access to internal resources, and potentially more sophisticated attacks such as man-in-the-middle operations. The ability to bypass access restrictions through spoofed IP addresses means that an attacker could potentially gain access to network segments that should be protected by the router's security policies. This vulnerability is particularly dangerous in enterprise environments where routers serve as critical boundary devices between different network zones, as it could allow attackers to traverse network perimeters and access sensitive internal systems. The impact is amplified because the flaw exists in the core routing functionality of these devices, meaning that any network traffic passing through the affected routers could be subject to this bypass mechanism. Organizations relying on these specific router models for IPv6 network connectivity would be exposed to significant risk, especially if they depend on RPF as part of their network security strategy.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on immediate firmware updates from the vendor to address the RPF implementation flaw. Network administrators should also consider implementing additional security controls such as ingress filtering at network boundaries, enhanced monitoring of suspicious traffic patterns, and regular security assessments of their routing infrastructure. The vulnerability highlights the importance of proper implementation of security mechanisms like RPF and demonstrates why network security cannot rely solely on perimeter defenses. Organizations should also review their IPv6 deployment strategies to ensure that they are not inadvertently exposing their networks to similar vulnerabilities. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to techniques involving network sniffing and spoofing, as well as privilege escalation through network access. The remediation approach should include not only patching the affected devices but also conducting comprehensive network security audits to identify any other potential security gaps in IPv6 implementations. Given the nature of the flaw, it is essential that organizations verify the firmware versions of their affected routers and ensure that all instances of these specific models are updated to versions that properly implement RPF validation.