CVE-2010-3378 in scilab
Summary
by MITRE
The (1) scilab, (2) scilab-cli, and (3) scilab-adv-cli scripts in Scilab 5.2.2 place a zero-length directory name in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, which allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse shared library in the current working directory.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/07/2019
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-3378 represents a classic privilege escalation flaw affecting the Scilab scientific computing software suite. This issue manifests in three distinct script components: scilab, scilab-cli, and scilab-adv-cli, all present in Scilab version 5.2.2. The core problem stems from how these scripts handle the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable during execution, creating a dangerous condition that adversaries can exploit to elevate their privileges on affected systems.
The technical flaw occurs when the scripts execute with a zero-length directory name included in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH variable. This seemingly innocuous configuration creates a security vulnerability because it allows the dynamic linker to search the current working directory as part of the library loading process. When a user executes any of these scripts, the system attempts to load shared libraries from the current directory before searching standard library paths. This behavior creates an opportunity for local attackers to place malicious shared libraries in the current working directory, which will then be loaded by the vulnerable scripts and executed with the privileges of the script's user.
This vulnerability directly maps to CWE-426, which describes the "Untrusted Search Path" weakness, where programs search directories in an untrusted order. The flaw also aligns with the ATT&CK technique T1068, "Local Privilege Escalation," as it provides a mechanism for local users to gain elevated privileges. The issue is particularly concerning because it requires no special privileges to exploit, making it a low-hanging fruit for attackers who have access to a system where Scilab is installed and used.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation. Since the affected scripts are commonly used for scientific computing and data analysis, they are frequently executed by users in various environments. Attackers can leverage this flaw in scenarios where users run Scilab scripts in directories containing malicious shared libraries, potentially leading to complete system compromise. The vulnerability affects not just individual user accounts but could also impact system security when Scilab is used in multi-user environments or automated processes. Organizations running Scilab 5.2.2 should consider this vulnerability as a critical security concern, particularly in environments where users may have the ability to place files in directories where Scilab scripts are executed.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on modifying the script execution environment to prevent the inclusion of zero-length directory names in LD_LIBRARY_PATH. System administrators should update to a patched version of Scilab, as the vulnerability was resolved in later releases. Additionally, security hardening measures such as setting LD_LIBRARY_PATH explicitly without including current directory references, using secure execution environments, and implementing proper file permissions can help prevent exploitation. Regular security audits should also verify that no scripts or applications are inadvertently setting insecure library search paths, as this vulnerability demonstrates how seemingly minor configuration issues can lead to significant privilege escalation capabilities.