CVE-2010-3381 in tangerine
Summary
by MITRE
The (1) tangerine and (2) tangerine-properties scripts in Tangerine 0.3.2.2 place a zero-length directory name in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, which allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse shared library in the current working directory.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/07/2019
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-3381 affects the Tangerine 0.3.2.2 software suite, specifically targeting two critical scripts named tangerine and tangerine-properties. This issue represents a classic privilege escalation vulnerability that exploits improper environment variable handling within the software's execution context. The flaw manifests when these scripts incorporate a zero-length directory name into the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable, creating a dangerous condition that can be exploited by local attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from the insecure manipulation of the LD_LIBRARY_PATH variable, which is a fundamental component of Unix-like operating systems that dictates where shared libraries should be loaded from during program execution. When a zero-length directory name is included in this path, it effectively creates a reference to the current working directory, as an empty string in a path context resolves to the present location. This behavior violates the principle of least privilege and creates an exploitable condition where malicious actors can place crafted shared libraries in the current working directory, which will then be loaded and executed by the vulnerable scripts with the privileges of the user running them.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability poses significant risk to systems running affected versions of Tangerine, as it enables local privilege escalation attacks that can be executed with minimal user interaction. The attack vector requires only that a malicious user has write access to the current working directory when the vulnerable scripts are executed, which is often achievable in many typical usage scenarios. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it does not require network access or remote exploitation capabilities, making it a serious threat in environments where local access is possible, such as shared computing environments, development workstations, or systems where users have shell access.
The security implications of this vulnerability align with CWE-426, which describes the weakness of "Untrusted Search Path" where an application searches for libraries or executables in directories that may be controlled by untrusted users. This weakness is further categorized under the broader ATT&CK framework as privilege escalation techniques, specifically involving the use of malicious libraries to gain elevated system access. The vulnerability demonstrates how seemingly minor implementation flaws in environment variable handling can create significant security risks, particularly when combined with the inherent trust placed in the current working directory by the dynamic linker mechanism.
Effective mitigation strategies for this vulnerability include immediate patching of the affected Tangerine software to version 0.3.2.3 or later, which should address the improper LD_LIBRARY_PATH construction. Additionally, system administrators should implement proper access controls and privilege separation, ensuring that users cannot write to directories where vulnerable scripts execute. The principle of least privilege should be enforced by configuring scripts to not include empty or user-controllable elements in library search paths, and by implementing strict directory permissions that prevent unauthorized modifications to script execution contexts. Organizations should also consider implementing monitoring solutions that can detect suspicious library loading patterns and unauthorized modifications to critical system directories.