CVE-2010-3383 in TeamSpeak
Summary
by MITRE
The (1) teamspeak and (2) teamspeak-server scripts in TeamSpeak 2.0.32 place a zero-length directory name in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, which allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse shared library in the current working directory.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/27/2021
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-3383 affects TeamSpeak 2.0.32 client and server scripts that improperly handle the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable. This flaw represents a classic privilege escalation vulnerability that exploits how dynamic linkers resolve shared libraries. When the TeamSpeak scripts execute with elevated privileges, they inadvertently set LD_LIBRARY_PATH to include an empty directory name, creating a dangerous condition where the system will search for shared libraries in the current working directory before examining standard system paths.
This vulnerability directly maps to CWE-426, which addresses the execution of untrusted code through insecure library loading mechanisms. The issue stems from the insecure practice of including empty or relative paths in library search paths, allowing attackers to place malicious shared libraries in the current working directory where the TeamSpeak processes execute. When these processes attempt to load required libraries, the dynamic linker will first find and execute the attacker-controlled shared library from the current directory rather than the legitimate system libraries, thereby executing arbitrary code with the privileges of the TeamSpeak process.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant as it provides local attackers with a straightforward path to privilege escalation. Since TeamSpeak server processes typically run with elevated privileges to manage network connections and system resources, successful exploitation can result in complete system compromise. Attackers need only place a malicious shared library named identically to a required TeamSpeak library in the current working directory, and the system will execute this malicious code when the TeamSpeak process attempts to load the library. This attack vector requires no network connectivity and can be executed from any location where the attacker has write access to the working directory.
From an ATT&CK perspective, this vulnerability aligns with T1068, which covers privilege escalation through the exploitation of insecure library loading. The technique leverages T1546, which involves the modification of system processes to execute malicious code. The vulnerability also relates to T1059, as attackers can potentially use the elevated privileges gained to execute additional malicious payloads or establish persistence mechanisms. Mitigation strategies should focus on removing empty directory entries from LD_LIBRARY_PATH, implementing proper privilege separation, and using secure library loading practices such as setting LD_PRELOAD to empty values or using absolute paths for library dependencies. Additionally, system administrators should ensure that TeamSpeak processes run with minimal required privileges and that the current working directory is properly secured against unauthorized modifications.