CVE-2010-3402 in UltraEdit
Summary
by MITRE
Untrusted search path vulnerability in IDM Computer Solutions UltraEdit 16.20.0.1009, 16.10.0.1036, and probably other versions allows local users, and possibly remote attackers, to execute arbitrary code and conduct DLL hijacking attacks via a Trojan horse dwmapi.dll that is located in the same folder as a bin, cpp, css, c, dat, hpp, html, h, ini, java, log, mak, php, prj, txt, or xml file.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/07/2019
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2010-3402 represents a critical untrusted search path issue affecting IDM Computer Solutions UltraEdit versions 16.20.0.1009 and 16.10.0.1036, with potential impact extending to other affected versions. This flaw manifests as a directory traversal weakness where the application fails to properly validate the source of dynamically loaded libraries, creating an exploitable condition that can be leveraged by malicious actors to execute arbitrary code. The vulnerability specifically targets the application's handling of dynamic link library (DLL) loading mechanisms, where the software searches for required libraries in the same directory as the opened file rather than using a secure, predefined search path approach. This behavior directly violates secure coding practices and creates a dangerous attack surface for both local and potentially remote adversaries.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from UltraEdit's improper DLL resolution process, which operates under the assumption that all libraries in the working directory are trustworthy. When a user opens a file with any of the supported extensions including bin, cpp, css, c, dat, hpp, html, h, ini, java, log, mak, php, prj, txt, or xml, the application searches for dependent DLLs in the same directory as the opened file. An attacker can place a malicious dwmapi.dll file in the same directory as a targeted file, causing the application to load and execute the malicious code instead of the legitimate system library. This technique constitutes a classic DLL hijacking attack pattern that aligns with the tactics described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the T1574.001 technique for DLL Side-Loading. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it requires no special privileges for local exploitation and can potentially be extended to remote code execution scenarios when combined with other attack vectors.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation as it enables attackers to gain complete control over the affected system. Local users can leverage this flaw to execute malicious code with the privileges of the targeted UltraEdit application, which typically runs with the privileges of the logged-in user. The attack can be particularly insidious because it requires minimal user interaction beyond opening a malicious file, making it suitable for social engineering campaigns. Remote exploitation scenarios become possible when attackers can influence the contents of directories where UltraEdit files are stored, potentially through web-based attacks or file sharing mechanisms. This vulnerability represents a significant risk to enterprise environments where UltraEdit is commonly used for code development and document editing, as it can serve as an initial access point for more sophisticated attacks.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2010-3402 should focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The most effective immediate solution involves upgrading to a patched version of UltraEdit that implements secure DLL loading practices, ensuring that the application searches for libraries in system directories rather than the current working directory. Organizations should implement application whitelisting policies that restrict the execution of unauthorized DLLs in user directories, particularly those containing the vulnerable file extensions. The implementation of secure coding practices including the use of absolute paths for DLL loading and the adoption of Windows' SafeDllSearchMode can significantly reduce the attack surface. Additionally, network segmentation and user access controls should be enforced to limit the potential impact of successful exploitation attempts. This vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of proper DLL loading security mechanisms as outlined in CWE-778 and aligns with the broader security principles found in the OWASP Top Ten, specifically addressing the risk of insecure library loading and privilege escalation through untrusted search paths.