CVE-2010-5154 in BitDefender Total Security 2010
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** Race condition in BitDefender Total Security 2010 13.0.20.347 on Windows XP allows local users to bypass kernel-mode hook handlers, and execute dangerous code that would otherwise be blocked by a handler but not blocked by signature-based malware detection, via certain user-space memory changes during hook-handler execution, aka an argument-switch attack or a KHOBE attack. NOTE: this issue is disputed by some third parties because it is a flaw in a protection mechanism for situations where a crafted program has already begun to execute.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/07/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-5154 represents a significant race condition within BitDefender Total Security 2010 version 13.0.20.347 on Windows XP systems. This flaw exists within the kernel-mode hook handler mechanism that is designed to monitor and block malicious activities at the system level. The race condition occurs during the execution of kernel-mode hooks, creating a temporal window where user-space processes can manipulate memory contents in ways that circumvent the intended protection. This vulnerability is classified as a race condition under CWE-362, which specifically addresses concurrent execution issues that can lead to security flaws. The attack vector specifically targets the timing-sensitive nature of kernel-mode hook execution, allowing malicious code to exploit a temporal gap between when a hook handler begins processing and when it completes its validation checks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is particularly concerning as it enables local users to bypass kernel-mode protections that would normally intercept and block dangerous code execution. This attack technique, known as argument-switch or KHOBE (Kernel Hook Obfuscation Exploitation), allows adversaries to manipulate memory during hook execution to effectively switch arguments or modify execution paths in ways that would normally be detected and blocked. The vulnerability essentially creates a bypass mechanism where malicious code can appear to be legitimate to signature-based detection systems while simultaneously evading kernel-mode monitoring. This dual bypass capability represents a sophisticated attack pattern that combines both kernel-level exploitation and evasion techniques, making it particularly dangerous in environments where kernel-mode protection is considered a primary defense mechanism.
From an attack perspective, this vulnerability aligns with several tactics described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, particularly those related to privilege escalation and defense evasion. The attack requires local system access but can lead to elevated privileges and persistent malicious presence through kernel-mode bypass techniques. The vulnerability demonstrates how protection mechanisms designed to defend against malicious code can themselves become attack vectors when race conditions are present in their implementation. The fact that this issue is disputed by some third parties highlights the complexity of evaluating such flaws, as it represents a protection mechanism failure rather than an initial infection vector. The disputed nature stems from the argument that the vulnerability only becomes exploitable when a malicious program has already begun execution, suggesting that it may be more accurately classified as a weakness in the defense-in-depth approach rather than a fundamental system vulnerability. This classification impacts how security professionals should approach remediation and risk assessment, as it suggests the vulnerability is more about protecting against already-executing malware rather than preventing initial compromise.
The technical implementation of this attack relies on precise timing and memory manipulation to change arguments or execution contexts during kernel hook processing. Attackers can leverage the temporal window created by the race condition to modify memory contents that are being processed by the hook handlers, effectively changing the behavior of the protection mechanism itself. This technique requires deep understanding of both the Windows kernel architecture and the specific implementation details of BitDefender's hooking mechanisms. The vulnerability essentially transforms the intended security boundary into an exploitable gap, allowing malicious code to execute in contexts where it would normally be blocked. Mitigation strategies should focus on eliminating the race condition through proper synchronization mechanisms, implementing more robust hook validation techniques, and ensuring that kernel-mode protection mechanisms cannot be bypassed through argument manipulation. Additionally, system administrators should consider implementing additional monitoring and logging around kernel-mode activities to detect potential exploitation attempts.